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GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY IN MARYLAND: A 
PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE TO MAKING AND 
DEFENDING TORT CLAIMS 
Karen J. Krugert 
INTRODUCTION 
Tort suits that involve the government as a party necessarily 
require the advocates to consider the impact of sovereign immunity 
on the litigation. 1 For practitioners who represent governmental 
entities and employees as defendants, sovereign immunity is an 
important defense, as it can serve to deprive a court of jurisdiction 
and completely deter a lawsuit. 2 Those who seek to sue the 
government must have a command of the waivers of sovereign 
immunity for which the law provides and be aware of the 
procedural requirements that often accompany those waivers in 
order for a suit to even be filed. 
Maryland appellate courts have explained that the Maryland 
doctrine of sovereign or governmental immunity "has survived 
repeated challenges over the years and remains a formidable 
obstacle to those who attempt to sue a governmental entity,,,3 and 
t Senior Assistant County Attorney, Harford County, Maryland; L.L.M. in Law & 
Government, Washington College of Law, American University; J.D., Rutgers 
University School of Law. I am indebted to Professor Jeremy Mullen and my 
classmates at Washington College of Law who offered valuable support and 
assistance with the early drafts of this Article. 
\. This Article does not address the questions of governmental immunity, or lack 
thereof, in contract actions. Some resources for practitioners to consult with 
respect to contract claims include: MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 12-201 (2004) 
(barring use of sovereign immunity defense in contract actions); MD. CODE ANN., 
art. 25B, § 13A (2005) (barring the defense by Maryland counties for certain 
actions); Harford County v. Town of Bel Air, 348 Md. 363, 372-73, 704 A.2d 
421,425-26 (1998); ARA Health Servs., Inc. v. Dep't of Pub. Safety & Corr. 
Servs .. 344 Md. 85, 91-95, 685 A.2d 435, 438-40 (1996) (waiving, to a limited 
extent, state sovereign immunity in contract actions); Md.-Nat'l Capital Park & 
Planning Comm'n v. Kranz, 308 Md. 618, 521 A.2d 729 (1987) (rejecting 
immunity in contract actions for counties and municipalities); Harold J. Krent, 
Reconceptualizing Sovereign Immunity, 45 VAND. L. REv. 1529, 1560-78 (1992). 
2. See, e.g., Koehler v. United States, 153 F.3d 263 (5th Cir. 1998) (stating that 
sovereign immunity deprives the courts of jurisdiction regardless of the merits of 
the underlying claim); Ronsonet v. Carroll, 113 F. Supp. 2d 1009, 1015 (D. Miss. 
2000) (stating that sovereign immunity deprives the court of jurisdiction); 
Annapolis Urban Renewal Auth. v. Interlink, Inc., 43 Md. App. 286, 294, 405 
A.2d 313, 318 (1979) (stating that sovereign immunity, as a substantive matter, is 
a legal defense); Frosburg v. State Dep't of Pers., 37 Md. App. 18, 375 A.2d 582 
(1977) (court held that the doctrine of sovereign immunity barred a suit against 
the state employer for back pay); Davis v. Educ. Servo Ctf., 62 S.W.3d 890, 895 
(Tex. App. 2001) (stating that the doctrine of sovereign immunity deprives the 
court of subject matter jurisdiction). 
3. Heffner v. Montgomery County, 76 Md. App. 328, 333, 545 A.2d 67,69 (1988). 
37 
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that the immunity is "deeply ingrained in Maryland law.,,4 The 
Court of Appeals described sovereign immunity as "[ 0 ]nce 
venerated, recently vilified, and presently substantially limited, [it] 
has long been recognized by this Court. We have applied the 
doctrine for over a century .... ,,5. Indeed, one of the earliest 
Maryland cases involving ~uestions of sovereign immunity was 
decided over a century ago, and as recently as October 2006, the 
Maryland Court of Appeals issued an opinion resolving questions 
of governmental immunity. 7 
This Article is a resource for practitioners in Maryland to 
consult when facing litigation in which the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity is an issue. It highlights the key features of the 
variations in the law of sovereign immunity and governmental 
waivers, with the goal of creating a starting point for litigants and 
their attorneys. This Article is not intended to be a complete 
treatise on the law of sovereign immunity in Maryland, but rather a 
practical resource to provide practitioners with familiarity of the 
Issue. 
My own experience as a government attorney has shown that 
Maryland litigators struggle with the theoretical underpinnings of 
the doctrine of sovereign immunity and the various statutory and 
jurisprudential exceptions to this immunity that relate to the civil 
liability of the government and its employees. The nature of the 
immunity and the conditions of waiver vary depending on which 
government is being subjected to suit (i.e., federal, state,8 or local), 
with further variations dependent on the character of the cause of 
action. The competent litigator must fully explore these issues 
before filing or defending a suit, or she risks losing a claim or 
defense. 
Part I of this Article provides a general overview of the 
historical foundations of the common law concept of sovereign 
immunity. The skilled practitioner should understand these 
concepts in order to apply the relevant legal principles and create 
new approaches to litigation involving sovereign immunity to best 
serve their clients' interest. Part II describes governmental waivers 
of sovereign immunity; those waivers are limited and their nature 
differs with the type of government or agency involved. This 
section is divided first by way of the common governmental 
hierarchy: federal, state, and municipal or local. In a second sub-
4. See Nam v. Montgomery County, 127 Md. App. 172, 182, 732 A.2d 356, 362 
(1999). 
5. Austin v. Mayor of Baltimore, 286 Md. 51, 53-55, 405 A.2d 255, 257 (1979). 
6. See State v. BaIt. & Ohio RR. Co., 34 Md. 344 (1871), ajJ'd sub nom., BaIt. & 
Ohio R.R. Co. v, Maryland, 88 U.S. 456 (1874). 
7. See Mayor of Baltimore v. Whalen, 395 Md. 154,909 A.2d 683 (2006). 
8. In this Article, the term "State" refers to the State of Maryland. 
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section, this Article discusses other "cross over" doctrinal and 
practical matters that come into play-again depending on the type 
of cause of action and the identity of the defendant( s). 
1. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY TO GOVERNMENTAL 
IMMUNITY, A BRIEF HISTORY 
Sovereign immunity is the legal construct that provides 
immunity to a government, protecting it from private lawsuits in 
tort. 9 Although the general principle of sovereign immunity is 
well-known, its origins and bases in the law are obscure. lo 
Scholars have examined sovereign immunity for centuries, II and 
although as a theoretical legal construct its historical foundation is 
weak, sovereign immunity's role in contemporary jurisprudence 
remains strong. 12 
Although sovereign immunity may have some origin in Roman 
law,13 it was certainly a part of early English common law, 
evidenced by a commonly held belief that "the Crown can do no 
wrong.'d4 This rationale was based on the idea that monarchs 
9. See generally Fleming James, Jr., Tort Liability of Governmental Units and Their 
Officers, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 610 (1955) (examining the history, reasoning, and 
policy of sovereign immunity); see Krent, supra note 1 (examining sovereign 
immunity as a means to protect the political process and whether rescinding 
sovereign immunity rules is desirable); see also Godwin v. County Comm'rs of 
St. Mary's County, 256 Md. 326, 334, 260 A.2d 295, 299 (1970) (discussing the 
applicability of the doctrine of sovereign immunity to the State, but also to its 
agencies and instrumentalities for the purposes of preventing tort liability). 
10. See Thomas A. Bowden, Comment, Sovereign Immunity from Statutes of 
Limitation in Maryland, 46 MD.L. REV. 408, 409 (1987) (discussing the 
underlying policies of sovereign immunity in a historical context). 
I 1. See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 
230 (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1765); KENNETH CULP DAVIS, CONSTITUTIONAL 
TORTS 4-14 (1984); 1 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE 
HISTOR Y OF ENGLISH LAW 518 (2d ed. 1898); Jack Boger, Mark Gitenstein & 
Paul R. Verkuil, The Federal Tort Claims Act Intentional Torts Amendment: An 
Interpretative Analysis, 54 N.C. L. REV. 497, 507-10 (1976); Edwin M. 
Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1 (1924); Leon Thomas 
David, The Tort Liability of Public Officers, 12 S. CAL. L. REV. 260, 283 (1939); 
Kenneth Culp Davis, Tort Liability of Governmental Units, 40 MINN. L. REv. 751 
(1956); Ludwik Ehrlich, Proceedings Against the Crown, 6 Oxford Studies in 
Social and Legal History 9 (Sir Paul Vinogradoff ed., 1921); David E. Engdahl, 
Immunity and Accountability for Positive Governmental Wrongs, 44 U. COLO. L. 
REv. I (1972-73); William Holdsworth, The History of Remedies Against the 
Crown, 38 L.Q. REV. 141 (1922); LouisL. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and 
Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1963); James, supra note 9; 
Daniel C. Kramer, The Governmental Tort Immunity Doctrine in the United 
States 1790-1955,1966 U. ILL. L. F. 795 (1966). 
12. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Against Sovereign Immunity, 53 STAN L. REv. 1201, 
1202 (2001) ("[S]overeign immunity is not fading from American jurisprudence; 
quite the contrary ... "). 
13. See DAVIS, supra note II, at 1-5; ROBERT DORSEY WATKINS, THE STATE AS A 
PARTY LITIGANT 2 (1927). 
14. See WATKINS, supra note 13, at 11. 
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were chosen and guided by divine providence, and thus did not 
commit misdeeds. 15 For a subject to accuse the Sovereign of 
illegal acts would have been contrafl to God's will, so the 
Sovereign enjoyed complete immunity. I 
Over time, the feudal idea that a king could not be sued in the 
courts that he himself created 17 gave way to the notion that the 
king was subject to the law, and "that the kinj was not only 
capable of but disposed toward doing wrong." I Indeed, some 
scholars have interpreted the expression "the king can do no 
wrong" to actually mean that the "the king must not, was not 
allowed, not entitled, to do wrong .... ,,19 Thus, medieval 
Englishmen recognized that the king did commit wrongs, even if 
he could not be sued in his .own courts without his consent. 20 They 
sought redress from the Crown through "petitions of right," and 
gradually a principle arose that "the king could not rightfully 
refuse to grant a petition of right. ,,21 
By the eighteenth century, evolving notions of the British 
Monarchy set jurisprudential scholars to the task of defining the 
changing nature of sovereign immunity. William Blackstone was 
the best known of these commentators and "was widely read in 
America both before and after the Revolution.,,22 Even modern 
American case law continues to cite Blackstone's Commentaries,23 
published in 1765.24 Of course, one of the key premises of the 
American Revolution was the colonists' rejection of the 
Monarchy,25 and how monarchical sovereign immunity 
transformed into American governmental immunity has been 
called "one of the [great] mysteries of legal evolution.,,26 
The solution to the mystery may be found in the fact that the 
American states were deeply in debt as a result of the 
Revolutionary War, thus creating a "good practical reason to 
15. See Bowden, supra note 10, at 410. 
16. Id. 
17. See Engdahl, sitpra note 11, at 3. 
18. Id. 
19. Id. at n.7. 
20. Id. at 3. 
21. Id. (discussing the distinction between petitions of right and "mere petitions of 
grace"). 
22. Id. at 4. 
23. See, e.g., Godwin v. County Comm'rs of St. Mary's County, 256 Md. 326, 330-
31, 260 A.2d 295, 297 (1970) (quoting Blackstone's Commentaries to establish 
the theory and application of the doctrine of sovereign immunity in Maryland). 
24. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 11. 
25. See Chemerinsky, supra note 12, at 1201-02 (stating that the "United States was 
founded on a rejection of a monarchy and of royal prerogatives"). 
26. Borchard, supra note 11, at 4. But see DAVIS, supra note 11, at 1-5 (stating that 
"[t]he sole basis for immunity of the American democracy from tort liability has 
been Blackstone's 1756 proposition: 'The king can do no wrong .... "'). 
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assume the doctrine's applicability without too much attention to 
whether it fit the new polity, and most men who thought of the 
matter at all were no doubt thus dissuaded from questioning its 
validity. ,,27 
The 1787 Constitution created a federal judiciary and a 
jurisdiction that did not make any exception for cases in which the 
defendant was either a state or the Union itselr,28 In 1793, the 
United States Supreme Court considered whether a state could be 
sued without its consent. 29 In Chisholm v. Georgia,30 four of the 
five justices found that a state was subject to federal court 
jurisdiction under the Constitution when being sued by citizens of 
another state, whether or not the state had consented to suit. 31 
Although the decision represented a reasonable interpretation of 
the Constitution32 in finding that it contained no explicit grant of 
sovereifn immunity, the holding caused great turmoil among the 
states. 3 States were suddenly faced with the possibility that they 
could be exposed to suits arising from debts incurred during the 
Revolutionary War-obligations that they could not possibly 
meet. 34 In response, Congress passed the Eleventh Amendment in 
1789.35 
In Cohens v. Virginia,36 Chief Justice Marshall wrote that "[t]he 
universally received opinion is, that no suit can be commenced or 
27. Engdahl, supra note II, at 6 (noting also the limited exception to the doctrine 
found in the Articles of Confederation for a special federal tribunal to settle inter-
state disputes). 
28. /d. at 6 (quoting U.S. CaNsT., art. III, § 2, cl. I to indicate the power of the 
permanent federal judiciary in controversies involving the Union or a state). 
29. See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793), superseded by U.S. CaNST. amend. 
XI. 
30. /d. 
31. [d. at 479-80; see also Engdahl, supra note II, at 7. 
32. Curiously, in Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Comm 'n, Justice Frankfurter 
mistakenly opined that "[sovereign] immunity from suit ... is embodied in the 
Constitution .... " 327 U.S. 573, 580 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
33. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 11 (1890) (discussing how the Chisholm 
decision created such shock which ultimately led to the Eleventh Amendment to 
the Constitution); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264,406 (1821) (discussing how 
the American states' general alarm over Chisholm led to the proposal of the 
Eleventh Amendment). 
34. See Cohens, 19 U.S. at 406-07. 
35. The Eleventh Amendment reads, in relevant part: "The Judicial power of the 
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, 
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another 
State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CaNsT. amend. XI. 
States were empowered to preserve sovereign immunity and escape suit in its 
own courts without its consent, and notions of comity and sovereignty saved each 
state from being subject to judgments rendered by courts in another state. See 
Engdahl, supra note II, at 8. 
36. 19 U.S. 264 (1821). 
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prosecuted against the United States.,,37 In 1882, the Supreme 
Court acknowledged: 
[W]hile the exemption of the United States and of 
the several states from being subjected as 
defendants to ordinary actions in the courts . . . 
[has] been repeatedly asserted here, the principle 
has never been discussed or the reasons for it given, 
but it has always been treated as an established 
doctrine. 38 
In The Siren,39 the Court endeavored to justify the doctrine when it 
said: "It is obvious that the public service would be hindered, and 
the public safety endangered, if the supreme authority could be 
subjected to suit at the instance of every citizen, and consequently 
controlled in the use and disposition of the means required for the 
proper administration of the government.,,40 States, too, invoked 
the doctrine of sovereign immunity with little additional 
justification.41 
In 1907, Justice Holmes noted: 
Some doubts have been expressed as to the source 
of the immunity of a sovereign power from suit 
without its own permission. . .. A sovereign is 
exempt from suit, not because of any formal 
conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical 
and practical ground that there can be no legal right 
37. Jd. at 411-12; see also Hill v. United States, 50 U.S. 386, 389 (1850). 
38. United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196,207 (1882). 
39. 74 U.S. 152 (1868). 
40. Id. at 154; see also Nichols v. United States, 74 U.S. 122, 126 (1868) (stating that 
the "principle is fundamental, applies to every sovereign power, and but for the 
protection it affords, the govemment would be unable to perform the various 
duties for which it was created."); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 18 (1890) 
(holding that the Eleventh Amendment bars suits against a state by citizens of its 
own, unless the state has consented thereto; sovereign immunity was already an 
established legal principle at the time of the adoption of the Constitution). 
41. Although the states surrendered some independence and sovereignty to the 
federal union under the Supremacy Clause, U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2, they did 
retain sovereignty within their own borders. The Eleventh Amendment was an 
attempt to define the limits of federal judicial power over the states. See LINDA 
MULLENIX, MARTIN REDISH & GEORGENE VAIRO, UNDERSTANDING FEDERAL 
COURTS & JURISDICTION 488 (1998); Kramer, supra note 11, at 810; see also 
Commonwealth v. Colquhouns, 2 Hen. & M. 213, 216 (Va. 1808) (addressing 
whether the Commonwealth was responsible for correcting the loss of tobacco 
unlawfully converted by inspectors); Black v. Rempublicam, 1 Yeates 140, 141-
43 (Pa. 1792) (addressing the appeal from the settlement of an account against the 
Commonwealth by the comptroller general and whether the Commonwealth was 
properly chargeable in the suit). The first recorded case examining whether 
municipalities have the privilege of sovereign immunity held that it does not. See 
Lobdell v. Inhabitants of New Bedford, 1 Mass. 153 (1804). However, eight 
years later, the court reversed itself. See Mower v. Inhabitants of Leicester, 9 
Mass. 247 (1812). 
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as against the authority that makes the law on which 
the right depends. 42 
43 
Given that sovereign immunity is common law, courts have the 
power to change it. 43 While some state courts have taken such 
initiative, no federal courts have done SO.44 And although the 
doctrine has been criticized,45 it has not been totally abrogated 
either by judicial action or by statute. Indeed, some degree of 
immunity for the government may be necessary to "maintain a 
proper balance among the branches of the federal government ... 
[and] to preserv[e] majoritarian policymaking and not from any 
need to honor any hoary traditions. ,,46 
Whatever the justification for sovereign immunity, it has deep, 
if not dense, historical roots and it is an established part of the 
American governmental system.47 The states were the first to 
enjoy the protection, then the federal government, and finally the 
municipal levels of government. Immunity also extends to certain 
governmental officials. 48 Federal49 and state 50 legislators, and all 
judges51 have absolute and unqualified immunity, regardless of the 
nature of their conduct. Quasi-judicial officials, such as 
prosecuting attorneys, have absolute immunity for their initiation 
of a prosecution of a criminal case. 52 Other government officials 
have been granted immunity, either by statute or through common 
law. 53 To the extent that those immunities apply in Maryland, they 
are addressed in the subsequent sections of this Article. 
42. Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907). 
43. See DAVIS, supra note II, at 1-7. 
44. Id. at 1-7 to 1-8 (noting that by 1976, twenty-nine state courts "had abolished 
chunks of sovereign immunity" and that thirty-four states have enacted statutes 
affecting the immunity). 
45. /d.; see also Krent, supra note I, at 1530-31. 
46. Krent, supra note I, at 1530-31. 
47. See Hill v. United States, 50 U.S. 386, 389 (1850). 
48. See, e.g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427 (1976) (prosecutors enjoy 
absolute immunity when acting within the scope of their authority). 
49. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. I; Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 201 
(1880) (stating that U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. I afforded the House of 
Representatives protection from the alleged charge offalse imprisonment). 
50. See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 314-18 (1975) (discussing that state courts 
have generally recognized that state school board officers should be protected 
from tort liability under state law for all good-faith, nonmalicious action taken to 
fulfill their official duties); see also Bailey v. Lally, 481 F. Supp. 203, 221-22 (D. 
Md. 1979) (extending immunity to Maryland Delegates). 
51. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-55 (1967) (stating that the immunity of 
judges from liability for damages for acts committed within their judicial 
jurisdiction is firmly rooted in common law). 
52. See Paehlman, 424 U.S. at 431. However, prosecutors may have only qualified 
immunity for acts committed when acting in the role of a criminal investigator or 
administrator. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 520-22 (1985). 
53. See, e.g., 28 U.S.c. § 2671 (2000) (military members and employees ofa federal 
public defender organization are treated as employees of the government under 
the FTCA); Jones v. Czapkay, 182 Cal. App. 2d 192, 205 (1960) (granting 
44 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 36 
The immunity enjoyed by governments, their agencies, and 
their employees derives from historical sovereign immunity, and is 
now most often referred to as "governmental immunity.,,54 
Maryland imported its concept of governmental immunity, 55 which 
bars tort litigation against a sovereign, from this historical 
foundation. 56 The legal principle is "alive and well in Maryland 
today,,,57 but does not apply equally to all governmental units. 
While the State of Maryland itself maintains "near-complete 
immunity from tort litigation . . . [,] municipalities and counties 
have a more limited immunity from such litigation.,,58 
These differences and distinctions in state law are discussed at 
length below, but now this Article turns its attention to the 
sovereign immunity of the federal government, and the legislative 
waiver of that immunity through the Federal Tort Claims Act,59 
which later became the basis for a similar Maryland statute. 
II. GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY IN CONTEMPORARY 
PRACTICE 
A. Congressional Waiver oj Sovereign Immunity on Behalf oj the 
United States 
1. The History of the Federal Tort Claims Act 
In 1855, Congress passed the Court of Claims Act,60 its first 
acknowledgement that absolutely barring suits a~ainst the federal 
government was impractical and perhaps unfair. 6 This Act made 
immunity for state health officers); List v. O'Connor, 167 N.E.2d 188, 189-90 
(Ill. 1960) (granting immunity for park district employees); Weast v. Budd, 349 
P.2d 912 (Kan. 1960) (granting immunity for city managers). 
54. See Maryland-Nat'! Capital Park & Planning Comm'n v. Kranz, 308 Md. 618, 
521 A.2d 729 (1987) (noting that traditionally the State's immunity was referred 
to as "sovereign immunity" while that attached to municipalities was called 
governmental immunity, the semantic difference now being insignificant, and the 
terms now used interchangeably). 
55. See Heffner v. Montgomery County, 76 Md. App. 328, 332, 545 A.2d 67, 69 
(1987). 
56. [d. at 332-33, 545 A.2d at 69. 
57. [d. at 333, 545 A.2d at 69. 
58. /d. 
59. 28 U.S.c. §§ 2671-2680 (2000). 
60. See Court of Claims Act, Ch. 122, 10 Stat. 612 (1855). The Federal Courts 
Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 27 (1982) (codified at 28 
U.S.C. § 171 (1988)) stated that the United States Claims Court was a successor 
court to the Court of Claims. The Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992, 
Pub. L. No. 102-572, 106 Stat. 4506 (codified at 28 U.S.c. § 171 (1994)) 
changed the name of the Claims Court to the United States Court of Federal 
Claims. 
61. See Boger et aI., supra note II, at 508. 
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the government liable only on its contracts,62 despite Alexander 
Hamilton's pronouncement nearly a century before that "contracts 
between a nation and individuals are only binding on the 
conscience of the sovereign, and . . . confer no right of action 
independent of the sovereign Will.,,63 
Until 1946, the only way a citizen could make a claim in tort 
against the federal government was to file a private bill in 
Congress. 64 But by enacting the Federal Tort Claims Act 
(FTCA),65 Congress broadened the liability of the United States, 
permitting recovery for the negligent acts of federal employees.66 
The concept underlying the statute is simple: The United States 
may be sued and is liable in the same way and to the same extent 
as a private individual under the same circumstances, in 
accordance with the law of the place in which the negligent or 
wrongful conduct by its agent occurred. 67 
In March 1974, Congress amended the FTCA68 in an important 
way. The Amendment, in effect, included within the coverage of 
the FTCA a group of intentional torts that were previously 
excluded. 69 This action has been referred to as the "intentional 
torts amendment.,,70 Contemporary events/1 and the Supreme 
Court ruling in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the 
Federal Bureau 0[ Narcotics,72 created the so-called 
"constitutional tort.,,7 The Court ruled that claimants may file 
62. See DAVIS, supra note 11, at 5; Gibbons v. United States, 75 U.S. 269, 274 
(1868) (stating that the government must pay for what it agreed to purchase). 
63. THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 508 (Alexander Hamilton) (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., 
1888). 
64. See Frank Hanley Santoro, A Practical Guide to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 63 
CONN. B. J. 224 (1989); Alexander Holtzoff, The Handling of Tort Claims Against 
the Federal Government, 9 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 311 (1942); Note, Tort 
Claims Against the United States, 30 GEO. L. J. 462 (1942). 
65. 28 U.S.c. §§ 2671-2680 (2000). For a comprehensive history of the FTCA, the 
legislative birth of which began in the 1920's, see generally Note, The Federal 
Tort Claims Act. 56 YALE L.J. 534 (1947). 
66. See Boger et aI.. supra note 11, at 508-09. 
67. See ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE 
SOURCEBOOK 599-632 (2d ed. 1992) (providing an overview of the history of the 
Federal Tort Claims Act); see also Krent, supra note 1, at 1546 (stating that the 
FTCA is predicated on state law). 
68. 28 U.S.c. § 2680(h) (1976), amending 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1970); see also 
Boger et aI., supra note II, at 498. 
69. See Boger et aI., supra note II, at 498. 
70. ld. 
71. ld. at 498-505 (discussing the actions taken by the federal government in quelling 
student riots at Jackson and Kent State Universities in May 1970, the 1971 May 
Day mass arrests in Washington, D.C., the prisoner rebellion at Attica State 
Prison in September 1971, and an infamous 1973 narcotics raid in Collinsville, 
Illinois). 
72. 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (holding that federal law enforcement officers could be sued 
under the Constitution itself, notwithstanding sovereign immunity). 
73. Boger et aI., supra note 11, at 510. 
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suits alleging such claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which 
provides jurisdiction in all cases "arising under the Constitution, 
laws, or treaties of the United States.,,74 
The 1974 Amendment affected § 2680(h) of the FTCA, which 
delineates the tort actions for which the United States has not 
waived immunity. 75 Under the Amendment, when "investigative 
or law enforcement officers of the United States Government,,76 
commit one of the excepted torts, suits on this basis are 
permitted. 77 
In 1988, Congress again modified the FTCA to clarify that it is 
the exclusive remedy for common law torts committed by federal 
employees within the scope of their employment. 78 This 
Amendment was a response to the Supreme Court's decision in 
Westfall v. Erwin, 79 a ruling that dramatically expanded the 
personal tort liability of federal employees.8o Through this 
Amendment, Congress conferred absolute immunity on all 
governmental officials for common law torts committed within the 
scope of federal employment. 81 
Thus, the FTCA permits a citizen to bring a civil action against 
the United States for personal injury or property damage that was 
caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of a 
74. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000). 
75. Generally speaking, 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (2000) lists the several instances in which 
federal tort claims procedures do not apply. Subsection (h), as noted above, lists 
tort actions for which the United States has not waived immunity. Prior to the 
1974 Amendment, § 2680(h) read as follows: "Any claim arising out of assault, 
battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, 
libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights." 28 
U.s.c. § 2680(h) (1970). 
76. 28 U.S.c. § 2680(h) (1976), amending 28 U.S.c. § 2680(h) (1970). 
77. The 1974 Amendment to § 2680(h) added the following proviso to the existing 
text: 
Provided, That, with regard to acts or omissions of investigative or 
law enforcement officers of the United States Government, the 
provisions of this chapter and section 1346 (b) of this title shall apply 
to any claim arising, on or after the date of the enactment of this 
proviso, out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, abuse 
of process, or malicious prosecution. 
8 U.S.c. § 2680(h) (1976); see also United States v. Andrews, 441 F.3d 220, 
226-27 (4th Cir. 2006) (reviewing the § 2680 definition of "law enforcement 
officer," and holding that a Bureau of Prisons officer is not covered by the § 2680 
exemption). 
78. See Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988 
(FELRTCA), Pub. L. No. 100-694, 102 Stat. 4563 (codified at 28 U.S.c. § 2679 
(1994». 
79. 484 U.S. 292 (1988), superseded by statute, Federal Employees Liability Reform 
and Tort Compensation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-694, 102 Stat. 4563 
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2679 (1994». 
80. [d. at 299. 
81. See Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act 
(FELRTCA) § 2, 102 Stat. at 4564. 
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government employee, so long as the employee was acting within 
the scope of his employment. 82 The employee is immune from 
suit. By virtue of the FTCA, the government has effectively 
substituted itself as the potential defendant in tort suits. 83 
Under the FTCA, the term "federal agency" includes the 
"executive departments, the judicial and legislative branches, the 
military departments, independent establishments of the United 
States, and corporations primarily acting as instrumentalities or 
agencies of the United States, but does not include any contractor 
with the United States.,,84 An "employee of the government" 
includes "(1) officers or employees of any federal agency, 
members of the military or naval forces of the United States, 
members of the National Guard while engaged in training or 
duty,,85 under certain sections of Title 32 of the Code, and: 
[P]ersons acting on behalf of a federal agency in an 
official capacity, temporarily or permanently in the 
service of the United States, whether with or 
without compensation, and (2) any officer or 
employee of a Federal public defender organization, 
except when such officer or employee performs 
professional services in the course of providing 
representation under section 3006A of Title 18 of 
the Code. 86 
2. Procedural Requirements of the FTCA 
Before filing suit, a claimant must file an administrative claim 
to the "appropriate federal agency" within two years of the alleged 
injury. 87 The claim must be for a specific compensatory amount 
and the claimant should also provide supporting documentation. 88 
Many agencies have established rather elaborate procedures for 
the presentation, investigation, and administrative disposition of 
tort claims, and thousands of claims are settled at the agency 
level. 89 
82. See 28 U.S.C. § 2679. 
83. FELRTCA made the FTCA the exclusive remedy for the common law torts 
committed by federal employees in the course of their employment. Previously, 
the government was clearly liable under the FTCA but it was unclear whether the 
employee was also liable. See DAVIS, supra note 11, at 23. 
84. 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (2000). 
85. Id. 
86. Id. 
87. See 28 U.S.c. §§ 2401, 2675(a) (2000). 
88. See 28 U.S.C. § 2675(b) (2000) (the amount of the claim cannot be increased 
after the suit is filed unless new evidence has been discovered in the interim); 28 
C.F.R. § 14.2(a) (1988) (the claim for money damages must be set forth in a 
certain and specific sum). 
89. See generally ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., supra note 67 (relating 
administrative law and regulatory practices and explanations of the laws broadly 
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The agency has a minimum of six months to evaluate the claim 
for settlement; if the agency does not respond to the claim within 
that timeframe, the claimant may presume a denial and file suit. 90 
The complaint must be filed in the United States District Court 
within six months of the denial, or the expiration of the denial 
period. 91 Venue is proper either in the district in which the alleged 
injury occurred or where the plaintiff resides.92 The cause of 
action is litigated based on the substantive tort law of the state in 
which the alleged wrongful act occurred. 93 Although most of the 
cases brought under the FTCA are founded in negligence, suit may 
also be brought for other tortious acts. 94 
The complaint must name the United States as the defendant, 
and the only remedy available is money damages. 95 The FTC A 
does not authorize equitable relief, punitive damages or pre-
judgment interest. 96 The FTCA does not provide for jury trials,97 
and attorney's fees are limited to 20 percent of the amount 
recovered for an administrative settlement entered into with an 
agency and 25 percent of litigation settlements or judgments. 98 
As a defendant, the United States has available all tort litigation 
defenses that a private party defendant would have under the same 
cause of action. 99 The United States may raise a defense of 
sovereign immunity in a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff has not 
applicable to federal agency officials); NAT'L CTR. ON POVERTY LAW, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE MANUAL FOR LEGAL AID ATTORNEYS (Jeffrey S. Gutman ed., 2004) 
(discussing litigation practices in both state and federal courts); see also Paul G. 
Cereghini, Note, Federal Tort Claims Act Administrative Claim Prerequisite. 
1983 ARIz. ST. L. 1. 173 (1983) (discussing the interpretation of the minimal 
notice requirement); John Sackett, Comment, The Art of Claimsmanship: What 
Constitutes Sufficient Notice of a Claim Under the Federal Tort Claims Act?, 52 
U. CIN. L. REv. 149 (1983) (discussing the requirements of a proper and sufficient 
FTCA claim); Note, Claim Requirement of the Federal Tort Claims Act: Minimal 
Notice or Substantial Documentation?, 81 MICH. L. REv. 1641 (1983) (provides 
recommendations that promote both the settlement and fairness policies of the 
FTCA amendments); Note, Federal Tort Claims Act: Notice of Claim 
Requirement, 67 MINN. L. REv. 513 (1982) (examines the notice provision of the 
FTCA and its underlying policies). 
90. See 28 U.S.c. § 2675(a) (2000). 
91. See 28 U.S.c. § 2401 (b)(2000). 
92. See 28 U.S.C. § 1402(b) (2000). 
93. See 28 U.S.c. § 1346(b)(I) (2000). 
94. See 28 U.S.c. § 2680(h) (2000); see also Boger et ai., supra note II, at 517-19. 
95. See 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b) (2000). 
96. See 28 U.S.c. § 2674 (2000). 
97. See 28 U.S.C. § 2402 (2000). 
98. See 28 U.S.c. § 2678 (2000). 
99. See. e.g., Starnes v. United States, 139 F.3d 540, 542 (5th Cir. 1998) (stating that 
the United States can assert the same defenses available to private citizens); 
Palmer v. Flaggman, 93 F.3d 196, 199 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that "the United 
States's waiver of sovereign immunity is limited by the same defenses available 
to private citizens ... "); Loughlin v. United States, 230 F. Supp. 2d 26, 44 
(D.D.C. 2002) (stating that "the United States is liable for tort claims in the same 
manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances"). 
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complied with the administrative prerequisites to suit as described 
above. 100 In addition, the FTCA contains more than a dozen 
exceptions to its waiver of sovereign immunity, such as claims 
arising in a foreign country, claims based on the performance of a 
discretionary function, and claims covered by certain other 
statues. 101 Finally, under the Feres doctrine, 102 the Supreme Court 
has held that the FTCA does not cover injuries to military 
personnel that occur in the course of military service. 103 
Once a complaint is filed, the plaintiff must serve the United 
States Attorney in the district under the provisions of Rule 
4(i)(1)(A) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and any local 
district rules. The plaintiff must also send a copy of the complaint 
by registered or certified mail to the Attorney General at the 
Department of Justice in Washington, D.C. 104 After service, the 
suit is litigated in the same manner as any federal civil action. 
Although many plaintiffs rely on the FTCA to bring suit against 
the United States, practitioners should be aware that there are more 
than forty other federal statutes that afford administrative or 
judicial remedies for certain additional kinds of losses that result 
from government action. These statutes include, for example, the 
Copyright Remedy Clarification Act,105 the Military and Foreign 
Claims Act,106 and the Public Vessels Act. 107 Each of these Acts 
sets out different kinds of available claims, covered claimants, 
remedies available, proof required, and administrative procedures. 
Discussion of these other waivers of sovereign immunity is beyond 
the scope of this Article, but there are other comprehensive 
resources available to the practitioner. 108 
100. See 28 U.S.c. §§ 2401(b), 2675(a) (2000). 
101. See 28 U.S.c. § 2680 (2000). 
102. See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950). 
103. Id. at 146. 
104. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(i)(1)(B). 
105. See 17 U.S.c. § 511 (2000). 
106. See 10 U.S.c. §§ 2731-2739 (2000). 
107. See 46 U.S.C. § 781 (2000). 
108. See, e.g., GEORGE A. BERMANN, ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., 
ADMINISTRATIVE HANDLING OF MONETARY CLAIMS: TORT CLAIMS AT THE 
AGENCY LEVEL (1984) (focusing on agency handling of tort and tort-like claims 
and the procedures by which the agencies exercise authority to entertain the 
claims); LESTER S. JAYSON & ROBERT C. LONGSTRETH, HANDLING FEDERAL TORT 
CLAIMS §§ 1.01-1.21 (Matthew Bender & Co. 2006) (providing a comprehensive 
discussion of all compensatory remedies available against the government). 
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B. Maryland Has Waived Its Common Law Sovereign Immunity 
Through the Maryland Tort Claims Act 
1. History of the Maryland Tort Claims Act 
The Maryland Tort Claims Act (MTCA)I09 is the sole method 
for suing the State of Maryland and its personnel in tort; it is a 
limited waiver of sovereign or governmental immunity.llo Under 
the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity, the State and its 
agencies or units may be sued only with "specific legislative 
consent" III for the type of suit in question. I 12 Under Maryland 
law, even where a statute specifically waives immunity, a suit may 
only be brought where there are "funds available for the 
satisfaction of the judgment" or the agency has been given the 
power "for the raising of funds necessary to satisfy a recovery 
against it." 113 
The MTCA provides a remedy for citizens who are injured by 
the negligent acts or omissions of state personnel acting within the 
scope of their public duties. 114 This limited waiver of sovereign 
immunity was the result of a compromise by the Maryland 
Legislature in balancing conflicting interests: an interest in 
providing a remedy to injured persons while protecting the State's 
fiscal reserves, and an interest in protecting state personnel from 
suit. 115 
When the General Assembly first waived sovereign immunity 
on July 1, 1982, it created a waiver of the immunity for the State, 
for its units, and for state personnel, who are acting in official 
capacities as to six specified tort actions. 116 Thus, the General 
Assembly waived the sovereign immunity of the State in tort to a 
limited extent: for only six specific torts and only to the extent and 
109. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T §§ 12-101 to 12-110 (2004). 
110. See infra notes 111-1l3. 
111. See Oep't of Natural Res. v. Welsh, 308 Md. 54, 58-59, 521 A.2d 313, 315 
(1986). 
112. Id.; see also Katz v. Wash. Suburban Sanitary Comm'n, 284 Md. 503, 507-08, 
397 A.2d 1027, 1030 (1979). 
1l3. See Univ. of Md. v. Maas, 173 Md. 554, 559, 197 A.2d 123, 125 (1938); see also 
Bd. of Trs. of Howard Cmty. Coil. v. John K. Ruff, Inc., 278 Md. 580, 590-91, 
366 A.2d 360, 366 (1976). 
114. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOv'T § 12-104; see also MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & 
JUD. PROC. § 5-522 (2002). 
115. See REpORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION TO STUDY THE LIABILITY OF PUBLIC 
EMPLOYEES ( 1978) (considering various issues relating to the issues surrounding 
the protection of public employees from potential and actual liability ); REPORT OF 
THE GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION TO STUDY SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY (1976) 
(discussing the fiscal impacts of sovereign immunity). 
116. See 1981 Md. Laws 1609; Kee v. State Highway Admin., 313 Md. 445, 448-49, 
545 A.2d 1312, 1314 (1988); State v. Card, 104 Md. App. 439, 446, 656 A.2d 
400,404 (1995); Foor v. Juvenile Servs. Admin., 78 Md. App. 151, 106-63,552 
A.2d 947, 951-53 (1989). 
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amount of insurance coverage. 117 Although the state employee 
who allegedly caused the harm could be sued, joinder of the State 
as a defendant was required if the plaintiff alleged that there was a 
"tortious act or omission that is within the scope" of the 
employee's public duties. I IS 
In 1984, the General Assembly restructured the MTCA, adding 
a seventh specific tort. 119 And in 1985, it expanded the Act 
waiving state immunity "as to a tort action," generally.120 But it 
was not until 2003 that the Court of Appeals determined that this 
language included "constitutional torts" arising from alleged 
violations of the state constitution.121 The 1985 Amendments also 
excluded from the waiver of immunity "acts and omissions 
committed [by state personnel] with malice or gross negligence," 
and designated that the entire Act be recodified in the State 
Government Article. 122 
Although the State waived its immunity more broadly, it did not 
waive its immunity for punitive damages; for interest before 
judgment; for claims arising from the combatant activities of the 
militia during a state of emergency; for acts or omissions not 
within the scope of the public duties of the personnel; or for acts or 
omissions that are committed with malice or gross negligence. 123 
Additionally, the State's immunity is waived only for 
compensatory damages up to a maximum of $200,000 for each 
claimant for mJuries ansmg from a single incident or 
occurrence. 124 In addition, before a claimant may file suit against 
the State, he must comply with certain notification procedures. 125 
117. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-403 (1984); Kee, 313 Md. at 455, 545 
A.2d at 1314; see also Ruff, 278 Md. at 590,366 A.2d at 366 (holding that even 
with a waiver of sovereign immunity, an action for a money judgment may not be 
maintained unless funds have been appropriated for that purpose). 
118. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-522(b); Simpson v. Moore, 323 Md. 
215,218,592 A.2d 1090,1091 (1991). 
119. See 1984 Md. Laws 1419-20 (codified at MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 12-104 
(1984)). 
120. See 1985 Md. Laws 2683 (codified at MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 12-104(a) 
(2004)); see also Simpson, 323 Md. at 219, 592 A.2d at 1092; Clea v. City 
Council of Baltimore, 312 Md. 662, 671 n.6, 541 A.2d 1303, 1307 n.6 (1988); 
Foor, 78 Md. App. at 161,552 A.2d at 952 (1989). 
121. See Lee v. Cline, 384 Md. 245, 266, 863 A.2d 297,310 (2004) (holding that the 
"immunity under the Maryland Tort Claims Act ... encompasses constitutional 
torts and intentional torts"). 
122. See Md. State Highway Admin. v. Kim, 353 Md. 313, 320-21, 726 A.2d 238, 242 
(1999); Simpson, 323 Md. at 218, 592 A.2d at 1091. 
123. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T §§ 12-104(b), 12-105; MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & 
JUD. PROC. § 5-522(a)(l)-(4). 
124. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 12-104(a) (1)-(2); MD CODE ANN., CTS. & 
JUD. PROC. § 5-522(a)(5); MD. CODE REGS. 25.02.02.02D( I) (1984). 
125. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 12-106(b) (2004); see also Simpson, 323 
Md. at 230-31, 592 A.2d at 1097 (1991 ) (discussing the procedural requirements 
for maintaining a claim against the State). 
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2. Immunity of State Personnel 
:'he (~eneral Assembly enacted important amendments to the 
M?\~A in 1990 concerning the immunity of state personnel. I26 
~::<.'ljle the State waived its sovereign immunity for torts, it 
};iep.~rved it for state employees, substituting the state government 
a3 the responsible party for torts committed by individual 
employees in certain circumstances. 127 State employees and others 
designated as "State personnel,,128 are immune from suit in courts 
of the State l29 and from liability in tort for tortious acts or 
omissions committed within the scope of their public duties, so 
long as the acts are made without malice or gross negligence. 130 In 
essence, state employees continue to enjoy a form of sovereign 
immunity, and the State has waived its own immunity on their 
behalf. Accordingly, tort suits must name the State of Maryland as 
defendant, and not an individual employee. 
The statutory immunity provided by the MTCA is qualified and 
if a complainant alleges with specific facts that an employee acted 
with malice or gross negligence, a plaintiff may be able to defeat 
the state employee's immunity. 131 This type of suit must be 
126. 1990 Md. Laws 2271 (expanding the definition of "State personnel"). 
127. See Lee v. Cline, 384 Md. 245, 261-62, 863 A.2d 297, 307 (2004) (stating that 
the "Maryland Tort Claims Act ... generally waives sovereign or governmental 
immunity and substitutes the liability of the State for the liability of the state 
employee committing the tort."). 
128. Generally, members of state boards and commissions are protected under the 
MTCA from personal liability for damages and expenses arising out of their 
service absent a finding of gross negligence or willful misconduct. See MD. 
CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T §§ 12-101 (a)(3)(i), 12-105 (2004); MD. CODE ANN., 
CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-522(b). For that reason, the State Treasurer has not 
purchased additional coverage except, and to the extent that, the MTCA does not 
cover a potential claim. An example of such a claim would be a claim of 
securities fraud under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. If the Treasurer 
did elect to purchase commercial coverage for an agency, the policy limits, terms 
and conditions of the commercial coverage will determine exposure and establish 
the limit of liability. MD. CODE REGS. 25.02.02.01(B) (1984). 
129. Despite that the statute seems to limit the immunity of state personnel "from suit 
in the courts of the State," under MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-522 (b), 
the United States District Court for the District of Maryland has routinely applied 
the Act to its cases. See, e.g., Maidy v. Guerzon, No. JFM-01-104, 2001 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 10559, at *20 (D. Md. July 23, 2001) (plaintiff cannot maintain a 
negligence action against state employee in federal court "because Maryland 
would pay the judgment"); White v. Md. Transp. Auth., 151 F. Supp. 2d 651, 657 
(D. Md. 2001). But see Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 397 (4th 
,Cir. 1990); Johnson v. Baltimore City Police Dep't, 757 F. Supp. 677, 678 (D. 
Md. 1991). 
130. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-522(a)(4). 
131. See Shoemaker v. Smith, 353 Md. 143, 163, 725 A.2d 549, 559-60 (1999) 
(holding that unless plaintiff establishes actual malice or gross negligence, the 
state employee is immune); Ford v. Baltimore City Sheriffs Office, 149 Md. 
App. 107, 120,814 A.2d 127, 134 (2002) (holding that MTCA "clearly provides" 
that a state employee acting within their scope of employment, and without 
malice or gross negligence, is immune from suit). 
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brought against the employee personally because the State retains 
its sovereign immunity as to that cause of action. Compensatory 
and punitive damages may be awarded only against the employee, 
and the MTCA damages limitation of $200,000 does not apply. 132 
Under the MTCA, the phrase "scope of public duties" is 
equivalent to the common law concept of "scope of 
employment"-that is, whether the employee's acts were 
authorized by the employer and were in furtherance of the 
employer's business. 133 If the employee's conduct was based on 
personal intentions, was outrageous or unauthorized, or at a time 
not usually considered a work period, the conduct may be beyond 
the scope of employment. 134 
"Malice" under the MTCA refers to the subjective state of mind 
of the tortfeasor 135 and is something beyond the merely reckless or 
wanton conduct that is associated with gross negligence. Under 
Maryland law, "malice" is defined as "an act without legal 
justification or excuse, but with an evil or rancorous motive 
influenced by hate, the purpose being to deliberately and willfully 
injure the plaintiff." 136 The plaintiff s proof of malice "must point 
to specific evidence that raises an inference that the defendant's 
actions were improperly motivated ... sufficient to support a 
reasonable inference of ill will or improper motive.,,137 Generally, 
conclusory allegations will not satisfy this burden of proof. 138 
"Gross negligence" carries a similarly high standard of proof, 
being defined as "an intentional failure to perform a manifest duty 
in reckless disregard of the consequences as affecting the life or 
property of another.,,139 Proof of gross negligence requires a 
showing of intentional "wanton or reckless disregard for human 
132. See Catterton v. Coale, 84 Md. App. 337,442-45,579 A.2d 781, 783-84 (1990) 
cert. denied, 321 Md. 638, 584 A.2d 67 (1991) (holding that a social worker 
acted with a dishonest purpose and therefore was not entitled to statutory 
immunity); Shoemaker, 353 Md. at 158, 725 A.2d at 557 (stating that the state 
immunity in tort actions is not waived for personnel acting outside the scope of 
their public duties or for actions made with malice or gross negligence). 
133. See Sawyer v. Humphries, 322 Md. 247, 253-54, 587 A.2d 467, 470 (1991). 
134. Id. at 255-56; see also MD. CODE REGs. 25.02.02.02 (1984). 
135. See Thacker v. City of Hyattsville, 135 Md. App. 268, 300-01, 762 A.2d 172, 
189-90 (2000). 
136. See Shoemaker, 353 Md. at 163, 725 A.2d at 560 (quoting Leese v. Baltimore 
County, 64 Md. App. 442,480,497 A.2d 159, 179 (1985»; Sawyer, 322 Md. at 
261, 587 A.2d at 474; see also Wells v. State, 100 Md. App. 693, 705,42 A.2d 
879,885 (1994); Catterton, 84 Md. at 342-44,579 A.2d at 783-84. 
137. Thacker, 135 Md. App. at 301, 762 A.2d at 189-90. 
138. See Foor v. Juvenile Servs. Admin., 78 Md. App. 151, 170, 552 A.2d 947, 956 
(1989); Elliott v. Kupferman, 58 Md. App. 510,528,473 A.2d 960, 969 (1984) 
(requiring clear and precise facts of malice to defeat immunity). 
139. Marriott Corp. v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 124 Md. App. 463, 478, 723 
A.2d 454,462 (1998) (quoting Romanesk v. Rose, 248 Md. 420, 423, 237 A.2d 
12, 14 (1968». 
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life or the rights of others.,,140 Accordingly, whether a state 
employee is deprived of his or her statutory immunity is evaluated 
from a subjective perspective, as it is the individual's personal 
intentions that define whether he or she acted with malice or gross 
negligence. 
3. Procedural Preconditions to Suit Under the MTCA 
As with the FTCA, the MTCA imposes another limitation on 
Maryland's waiver of sovereign immunity by requiring an 
administrative process as a prerequisite to filing suit. The MTCA 
establishes a comprehensive scheme setting forth specific 
procedural requirements that are preconditions to filing a suit 
against the State. 141 If a plaintiff fails to fulfill these conditions, 
sovereign immunity is not waived and a court is without 
jurisdiction to hear the case. 142 
The MTCA sets forth as the primary precondition to suit against 
the State a notice provision: "A claimant may not institute an 
action under this subtitle unless: (1) the claimant submits a written 
claim to the Treasurer or a designee of the Treasurer within 1 year 
after the injury to person or property that is the basis of the claim . 
. . . ,,143 The "discovery rule" that may be used to extend statutes of 
limitation in civil cases does not apply to this notice requirement, 
and the Court of Appeals has refused to recognize any "good 
cause" exception to the notice requirement. 144 
The State Treasurer must deny the claim before suit may be 
filed. 145 A "final denial" is either when "(1) ... the Treasurer or 
designee sends the claimant, or the legal representative or counsel 
for the claimant written notice of denial; or (2) if the Treasurer or 
designee fails to give notice of a final decision within 6 months 
after the filing of the claim.,,146 The MTCA's statute of limitations 
is the same as the standard under state law and requires that a 
claimant file suit within three years after the cause of action 
arises. 147 
140. See Foor, 78 Md. App. at 169-70; Boyer v. State, 323 Md. 558, 579-80, 594 A.2d 
121,131-32 (1991). 
141. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOy'T § 12-106(b)(1)-(3) (2004); see also Simpson 
v. Moore, 323 Md. 215, 230-31, 592 A.2d 1090, 1097 (1991). 
142. See Simpson, 323 Md. at 230-31,592 A.2d at 1097. 
143. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOy'T § 12-106(b). 
144. See Simpson, 323 Md. at 224-25, 592 A.2d at 1094; see also Trimper v. Porter-
Hayden, 305 Md. 31, 52, 501 A.2d 446,457 (1985); Cotham v. Bd. of County 
Comm'rs, 260 Md. 556, 565, 273 A.2d 115, 120 (1971). 
145. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOy'T § 12-106(b)(2); Gardner v. State, 77 Md. App. 
237, 244, 549 A.2d 1171, 1175 (I988) (denial of the claim by the Treasurer is a 
jurisdictional prerequisite to filing suit). 
146. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOy'T § 12-107(d)(I)-(2) (2004). 
147. See § 12-106(b)(3). 
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The claim must be in writing and state generally the basis of the 
claim. 148 It should contain a statement of the underlying facts, 
including the date and place of the alleged tort, make a specific 
demand for damages, give the name and address of the potential 
parties and their counsel, and be signed by the claimant, counselor 
other legal representative. 149 "Substantial compliance" with the 
requirement of § 12-107 is sufficient to satisfy the notice 
requirement with respect to the content of the notice,150 but notice 
to the agency or to the Attorney General is not sufficient, 
substantial compliance with the notice requirements, regardless of 
its contents. 151 
This advance notice allows the State Treasurer to investigate the 
merits of the claim, to determine whether it is covered by a 
commercial policy or is a self-insured loss, to consult with the 
Attorney General for a determination whether the Attorney 
General should represent the employee and/or defend the State, 
and to determine whether a claim should be settled and how much 
should be offered in settlement. 152 These procedural requirements 
allow the State Treasurer's Office a reasonable opportunity for an 
orderly consideration of the thousands of tort claims filed annually 
against the State. 153 
Once the Treasurer denies a claim, or it is deemed to have been 
denied,154 the claimant may file suit in the appropriate Maryland 
state court. The plaintiff must serve the suit on the Treasurer, 
although the Attorney General of Maryland will defend the action 
on behalf of the State and any of its units. 155 
4. The State's Insurance Program 
Currently, and with only a few discreet exceptions, the State is 
self-insured for liability in tort. Specifically, the Treasurer has 
148. See § 12-106(b)(I). 
149. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOy'T § 12-107(a). 
150. See Conaway v. State, 90 Md. App. 234, 242, 600 A.2d 1133, 1136-37 (1992). 
However, the doctrine of substantial compliance does not apply when no claim 
has been filed. See Johnson v. Md. State Police, 331 Md. 285,297-98, 628 A.2d 
162, 168 (1993). 
151. See MD. CODE REGS. 25.02.03.01-03 (2001). 
152. See Chinwuba v. Larsen, 142 Md. App. 327, 355-57, 790 A.2d 83, 98-100 
(2002), cert. granted, 369 Md. 179, 798 A.2d 551 (2002), rev'd on other 
grounds, 377 Md. 92, 832 A.2d 193 (2003). 
153. See Johnson 331 Md. at 294-96, 628 A.2d at 166-67. The Treasurer reports that 
the Insurance Division investigates and adjusts approximately 3,800 claims per 
year. See State of Maryland Treasurer's Office, 
http://www.treasurer.state.md.us/insurance.htm (last visited December 30,2006). 
154. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOy'T § 12-107(d)(2) (a claim is "finally denied" if 
Treasurer fails to give notice of a final decision within six months of the filing of 
a claim). 
155. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOy'T § 12-108(2004). 
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been charged with providing sufficient self-insurance "to cover the 
liability of the State and its units and personnel under the Maryland 
Tort Claims Act." 156 The State's tort liability under the MTCA is 
limited to $200,000 per claimant, and the Treasurer's regulations 
provide that the State's limit of liability is currently set at 
"$200,000 per claimant for all injury, loss, and damage to person 
and property arising from a single incident.,,157 The regulations 
also provide that "[t]he sovereign immunity of the State is not 
waived for claims in excess of the limits .... ,,158 Moreover, the 
Court of Appeals has explained that "a legislative waiver of 
sovereign immunity is ineffective unless specific legislative 
authority to sue the agency has been given, and unless there are 
funds available for the satisfaction of the judgment .... ,,159 
The Treasurer is permitted to purchase commercial 
. 160 d ' . I h msurance, an oes so lor certam speCla ty coverage, suc as 
aviation hull, rail car, boiler and large machinery, and port 
coverage. Claims relating to these specialty areas are filed with the 
Insurance Division, but adjusted and insured by the commercial 
coverage. 161 
The vast majority of the State's liability risks are covered by the 
State Insurance Trust Fund (SITF).162 Under the SITF, the 
Treasurer categorizes claims into four basic categories. Non-
catastrophic claims that are related to real and personal property 
loss from fire, vandalism, storm damage, and the like, are adjusted 
by the Insurance Division of the State Treasurer's Office, and are 
covered by the self-insurance previously mentioned. 163 The srTF 
also covers claims for officers' and employees' liability, including 
awards made through the Board of Public Works l64 for such 
settlements or judgments against state employees or officials for 
IS6. [d. § 9-lOS( c). 
IS7. MD. CODE REGS. 2S.02.02.02(D)(l) (2001); see also MD. CODE ANN., STATE 
GOy'T § 12-104(a)(2) (2004). 
IS8. MD. CODE REGS. 2S.02.02.02(E). 
IS9. Katz v. Wash. Suburban Sanitary Comm'n, 284 Md. S03, S12, 397 A.2d 1027, 
1032 (1979) (emphasis added). 
160. MD. CODE REGS. 2S.02.02.01(A) (2001). 
161. See MD. CODE REGS. 2S.02.06.01-01 (2001); State of Maryland Treasurer's 
Office, http://www.treasurer.state.md.us/insurance.htm (last visited December 30, 
2006). 
162. The University System of Maryland has independent authority to purchase 
insurance, MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 12-104(i)(2) (2004); the Mass Transit 
Administration is self-insured for torts committed by its personnel. MD. CODE 
ANN., TRANSP. § 7-702(a)-(b) (2001). 
163. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 9-10S (2006); see also State of Md. 
Treasurer's Office, http://www.treasurer.state.md.us/insurance.htm (last visited 
Dec. 30, 2006). 
164. MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 9-lOS(a)(l)(iv); see also MD. CODE ANN., 
~TATE GOy'T § 12-S01(a)(I) (2004). 
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actions brought under federal statutes, for which the employees or 
officials do not enjoy state statutory immunity. 165 
General tort claims are the third category of risk handled by the 
Insurance Division and include premises liability, professional 
liability, and other claims arising from services provided by the 
State. 166 Finally, the Treasurer also self-insures for motor vehicle 
comprehensive and liability coverage, which includes both tort 
claims arising from the operation of motor vehicles by state 
personnel and claims for repair or replacement of state vehicles 
damaged in automobile accidents. 167 
In every budget bill since the enactment of the MTCA, the 
General Assembly and the Governor have deposited funds into the 
SITF for the State's self-insurance reserve. 168 The SITF is 
comprised of general fund and special fund appropriations in the 
state budget to the Treasurer, and state agencies pay annual 
premiums to the SITF and make reimbursements for losses paid 
out of the SITF. 169 
The Treasurer is responsible for maintaining the solvency of the 
SITF and with setting agency premiums "so as to produce funds 
that approximate the payments from the Fund.,,170 Each state 
agency has an annual $1,000 deductible for each loss paid from the 
SITF,which is paid from appropriations in the agency's budget. 171 
5. Discretionary Payment Provision 
The MTCA allows the Treasurer to make discretionary 
payments from the SITF in excess of $200,000 when a judgment or 
165. See State v. Card, 104 Md. App. 439, 444-45, 656 A.2d 400, 403 (1995) (stating 
that federal civil rights lawsuits are outside the scope of the Act and that the 
counties must pay the insurance costs and reimburse the State for any judgments 
paid out). 
166. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 9-105(c) (2006); see also State of 
Maryland Treasurer's Office, http://www.treasurer.state.md.us/insurance.htm 
(last visited Dec. 30, 2006). 
167. See State of Maryland Treasurer's Office, 
http://www.treasurer.state.md.us/insurance.htm (last visited Dec. 30, 2006). 
168. See, e.g., S.B. 110,2006 Leg., 421st Sess. (Md. 2006) (appropriating $8 million 
to agency budgets for tort claims). 
169. MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 9-103(b)(2). On a yearly basis, the 
Treasurer's actuaries assess the SITF's reserves and each agency's loss for 
property damage, tort claims and constitutional claims. The actuaries and the 
Insurance Divisions calculate a per capital rate for each person and vehicle 
assigned to each agency, which includes administrative expenses of the Insurance 
Division. The Agency's loss history incurred since the previous budget cycle is 
added to the baseline rate and the losses are amortized over a five year period to 
compute the Agency's annual premium. See State of Maryland Treasurer's 
Office, http://www.treasurer.state.md.us/insurance.htm (last visited December 30, 
2006). 
170. MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. &PROC. § 9-106(b). 
171. [d. § 9-107(c). 
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settlement has been entered granting a claimant damages in excess 
of the statutory maximum if the Board of Public Works has 
approved the supplement. 172 While the discretionary payment 
provision appears to provide broad authority for the Attorney 
General or the Treasurer to recommend to the Board of Public 
Works that it approve payments in excess of the limitation, in 
practical terms it does not. First, budget bills since 1987 have 
included restrictions that limit the Treasurer's abili~ to settle and 
pay a tort judgment above the maximum amount. 17 Second, the 
Treasurer's own regulation allows her to make a recommendation 
to the Board of Public Works only if the initial settlement or 
judgment is paid from the commercial insurance and in the amount 
of the commercial insurance limits. 174 Because nearly all claims 
against the State are covered by the SITF, almost none of the 
potentially excessive claims would meet these requirements. 
6. Multiple Claimants from Single Incident or Occurrence 
The MTCA strictly limits the State's liability for tort claims 
filed against the State, not to "exceed $200,000 to a single claimant 
for injuries arising from a single incident or occurrence,,,175 and 
the State's sovereign immunity is only waived up to that monetary 
limit. 176 The Treasurer's regulations further provide that all 
persons claiming damages resulting from bodily injury to, or the 
death of, any person shall be considered as one claimant. 177 
The most common challenge to the single limitation provision 
arises in wrongful death or survival actions where there are often 
several statutory beneficiaries seeking recovery. 178 Although there 
has been no appellate decision on the issue, the regulation should 
survive any challenge that the provision is in derogation of the 
waiver of sovereign immunity under the MTCA. 179 There are three 
primary reasons why the single cap recovery for wrongful death or 
survival actions is appropriate. 
172. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOy'T § 12-104(c)(1)(i)-(iii). 
173. See, e.g., S.B. 110,2006 Leg., 421st Sess. (Md. 2006). 
174. MD. CODE REGS. 25.02.02.03 (1984). 
175. MD. CODE ANN, STATE GOy'T § 12-104(a)(2) (2004). 
176. /d.; MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-522(a)(5) (2002); MD. CODE REGS. 
25.02.02.E (1984); Gooslin v. State, 132 Md. App. 290, 295, 752 A.2d 642,644 
(2000) (holding that MTCA limitations on damages is not an unconstitutional 
restriction on the rights of injured persons to recover fair compensation). 
177. MD. CODE REGS. 25.02.02.02 D(1)(a). In addition, damage to, or destruction of, a 
single item of property s:,all be considered to be one claimant. MD. CODE REGS. 
25.02.02.02 D(1)(b). 
178. MD CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-904 (2002). 
179. Interview with Laura C. McWeeney, Assistant Attorney General, Deputy Counsel 
to the State Treasurer (2003). 
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First, the statute, the regulations, and the State's insurance 
coverage clearly limit the State's liability under the MTCA, based 
on the occurrence of bodily injury and not upon the number of 
claimants claiming derivative damages from that injury.180 This 
view is consistent with the Court of Appeals' interpretation of 
analogous commercial insurance bodily injury provisions. 181 
Second, the regulations were enacted pursuant to the broad 
authority granted to the Treasurer by the General Assembly, and 
are consistent with the spirit of the law and do not contradict its 
statutory language or purpose; therefore, the regulations are 
presumptively valid. 182 
Third, and most importantly, every year since the passage of the 
MTCA in 1982, the General Assembly and the Governor have 
enacted a budget bill appropriating money from the State's self-
insurance reserves into the SITF. Every state budget enactment 
from 1982 to the present has adopted the single damages limitation 
or occurrence limit. 183 The language of each budget bill 
specifically states that payment of settlements and judgments under 
the MTCA must be made in accordance with the Treasurer's 
regulations. 184 The annual budget bill enactments provide that the 
monies appropriated by the General Assembly to the SITF are the 
only funds available to make payments under the MTCA. 
Accordingly, recovery in excess of $200,000 from the SITF or 
execution against other state assets for recovery, even by multiple 
claimants, is inappropriate. 185 
7. Miscellaneous Issues of Interest 
A state employee who is named as a defendant will, in most 
cases, raise in a pre-trial motion, the defense of statutory immunity 
described above. If a court denies that claim, the employee may 
not immediately appeal the order denying the sovereign immunity 
defense, because it is a defense only from liability and not 
necessarily from suit. 186 Such an order is not a final judgment on 
180. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 12-104 (2004). 
181. See Surratt v. Prince George's County, 320 Md. 439, 452, 578 A.2d 745, 751 
(1990) (only one bodily injury suffered); Daley v. U.S. Auto. Ass'n, 312 Md. 
550, 553-54, 541 A.2d 632, 633 (1988); see also Igwilo v. Prop. & Cas. Ins. 
Guar. Corp., 13 I Md. App. 629, 638, 750 A.2d 646, 651 (2000). 
182. See Lussier v. Md. Racing Comm'n, 343 Md. 681, 687, 684 A.2d 804, 806 
(1996) (citing Christ v. Dep't of Natural Res., 335 Md. 427, 437, 644 A.2d 34, 38 
(1994)). 
183. See. e.g., S.B. 110,2006 Leg., 421st Sess. (Md. 2006). 
184. Id. 
185. See Bd. of Trs. of Howard Cmty. Coil. v. John K. Ruff Inc., 278 Md. 580, 590, 
366 A.2d 360, 366 (1976). 
186. Compare this to the immunity from suit and liability that is provided by the 
qualified immunity recognized by federal law. See infra Part II(G). 
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the merits of the litigation and, therefore, the collateral order 
doctrine does not apply to allow for interlocutory appeal. 187 
However, if the state employee-defendant claims absolute, as 
opposed to qualified, immunity as defined by the MTCA, a denial 
of that defense may be immediately appealed. 188 
The State may also seek other bases for dismissal or summary 
judgment early on in MTCA litigation, such as noting defects in 
the original claim notice, whether the claim has been finally 
denied, if the demand for damages exceeds $200,000, and whether 
the property involved belongs to the State. The State may assert 
these defenses, in addition to those provided by the Maryland 
Rules, which, of course, are available to the State. 189 Moreover, 
the "State's agencies may not waive sovereign immunity, either 
affirmatively or by failing to plead it" as a defense,190 and the State 
may raise the defense for the first time on appeal. 191 
When the State of Maryland or its employees are sued in 
another state, the protections of the MTCA do not apply. Thus, the 
State's liability is potentially unlimited and state employees do not 
enjoy statutory immunity. While the State of Maryland may argue 
that the comity doctrine l92 allows for another state to recognize 
and apply the MCT A in its courts, the other state has no obligation 
to do so. The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States 
Constitution 193 does not require that a state recognize another 
state's laws granting itself and its agencies immunity from suit. 194 
However, the United States Supreme Court has noted that "[i]t 
may be wise policy, as a matter of harmonious interstate relations, 
for States to award each other immunity or to respect any 
established limits on liability. They are free to do so." 195 
Finally, attorneys who bring claims or cases against the State of 
Maryland pursuant to the MTCA "may not charge or receive 
187. Shoemaker v. Smith, 353 Md. 143, 169-70, 725 A.2d 549, 562-63 (1999); 
Maryland v. Jett, 316 Md. 248, 251, 558 A.2d 385,386 (1989). 
188. Rice v. Dunn, 81 Md. App. 510, 513, 568 A.2d 1125, 1127 (1990) (reversing a 
Circuit Court's ruling denying appellant's motion for summary judgment based 
upon absolute immunity). 
189. See, e.g., MD. R. CIv. P. 2-322. 
190. Dep't of Natural Res. v. Welsh, 308 Md. 54, 60, 521 A.2d 313, 315 (1986) (citing 
Bd. ofTrs. of Howard Cmty. Coli., 278 Md. at 584, 366 A.2d at 362-63 (1976». 
191. Foor v. Juvenile Servs. Admin., 78 Md. App. 151, 160, 552 A.2d 947, 951 
(1989). 
192. "Comity" is viewed as deference to another state's law where the situation 
involves an important matter of public policy and its application is not 
"obnoxious" to the forum state. Pac. Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm'n, 306 
U.S. 493, 502-04 (1939). 
193. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
194. Kent County. v. Shepherd, 713 A.2d 290, 296-97 (Del. 1998) (demonstrating the 
Court's refusal to apply MTCA to case in which injury occurred in Delaware). 
195. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 426 (1979). 
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fees" 196 in excess of 20 percent of a settlement or 25 percent of a 
judgment obtained. 197 
C. The State of Maryland Has Not Waived Its Eleventh 
Amendment Immunity 
The State of Maryland is immune from suit in federal court by 
virtue of the Eleventh Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, unless the State has waived the immunity or 
Congress has overridden the immunity. 198 The Supreme Court has 
held that "the Constitution does not provide for federal jurisdiction 
over suits against nonconsenting States.,,199 In other words, a state 
generally cannot be sued in federal court without first .giving 
consent to the suit. 
However, Congress does have the power to abrogate a state's 
immunity based on its powers found in the United States 
Constitution, including, without limitation: the Commerce Clause 
of Article I and section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 2oo 
Congress did so, for example, when enacting remedial statutes 
such as the Age Discrimination in Employment Act201 and the 
Americans with Disabilities Act. 202 
When the Eleventh Amendment applies, states are immune 
regardless of the type of relief that is sought, be it monetary, 
injunctive or declaratory.203 The State of Maryland's waiver of 
immunity in its own courts through the MTCA is not a waiver of 
Eleventh Amendment immunity in the federal courts. 204 Indeed, 
"only where stated 'by the most express language or by such 
overwhelming implication ... as [to] leave no room for any other 
construction,,,205 may a court find that a state has waived its 
sovereign immunity.206 A state's immunity may be waived when 
the state elects to subject itself to the authority of the federal court 
by appearing "in a judicial proceeding for the purpose of inducing 
196. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 12-109 (2004). 
197. !d. 
198. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89,99 (1984). 
199. Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 726 (2003) (finding that 
Congress validly abrogated state immunity in passing the Family and Medical 
Leave Act). 
200. Id. at 726-27. 
201. 29 U.S.c. § 621 (2000). 
202. 42 U.S.c. § 12101 (2000). 
203. Cory v. White. 457 U.S. 85,91 (1982). 
204. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234,239-41 (1985); Pennhurst State 
Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984); Weller v. Dep't of Soc. 
Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 397-98 (4th Cir. 1990). 
205. Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 239-40 (quoting Edelman v. Jordan 415 U.S. 651, 673 
(1974)). 
206. Id. 
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the court to act or refrain from acting.,,207 For example, in Moreno 
v. University of Maryland,208 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit found that a Maryland state agency waived its 
immunity by obtaining from the federal court a stay of an 
injunction and represented to the court that it would comply with 
the relief ordered if it lost its appeal of the injunction. 209 
Additionally, if the State of Maryland files a counterclaim to a 
federal suit, that action may be construed as a waiver of 
immunity.2lo However, the Fourth Circuit has also held that a 
State Assistant Attorney General does not have the authority to 
consent to a suit in federal court which would otherwise be barred 
by the Eleventh Amendment. 211 Lastly, because of the Eleventh 
Amendment, the State of Maryland cannot be held liable for the 
alleged unconstitutional acts of its employees under 42 U.S.C. § 
1983 cases brought in federal COurt. 212 
D. The Local Government Tort Claims Act Does Not Waive the 
Governmental Immunity of Local Entities 
Tort claims and lawsuits brought against local governments are 
regulated by the Local Government Tort Claims Act (LGTCA).213 
Unlike the MTCA, the LGTCA does not waive sovereign 
immunity and, in fact, "has nothing to do with waiver of sovereign 
immunity.,,214 Local governments have retained governmental 
immunity for the exercise of governmental functions,215 as IS 
further explained below. 
The LGTCA defines "local governments" in broad terms to 
include counties, municipalities and miscellaneous governmental 
entities such as the Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission, 
the Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commissions, 
public libraries, community colleges, and others. 216 However, 
207. Vargas v. Trainor, 508 F.2d 485, 492 (7th Cir. 1974). 
208. 645 F.2d 217 (4th Cir. 1981), ajJ'd sub nom., Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. I (1982). 
209. Moreno, 645 F.2d at 220-21. 
210. See Sue & Sam Mfg. Co. v. B-L-S Constr. Co., 538 F.2d 1048, 1051-53 (4th Cir. 
1976) (providing an analysis of factors to consider in determining immunity 
question). 
211. Linkenhoker v. Weinberger, 529 F.2d 51, 54 (4th Cir. 1975). 
212. Quem v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 332 (1979). States are also not "persons" that are 
covered by the statute subjecting § 1983 cases filed in state court against the State 
subject to dismissal on that basis. See Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 
U.S. 58, 71 (1989). 
213. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-30 I (2002) (enacted by 1987 Laws of 
Maryland, Ch. 594); see Hous. Auth. of Baltimore City v. Bennett, 359 Md. 356, 
357-58,754 A.2d 367, 367-68 (2000). 
214. Williams v. Montgomery County, 123 Md. App. 119, 129,716 A.2d 1100, 1105 
(1998), ajJ'd sub nom., Williams v. Maynard, 359 Md. 379, 754 A.2d 379 (2000). 
215. Pavelka v. Carter, 996 F.2d 645, 650 (4th Cir. 1993). 
216. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-301(d) (2002). 
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County Sheriffs are not part of "local government;" they are state 
officials,217 protected by the MTCA. . Likewise, the Baltimore 
Police Department is a state agency,218 not a local agency, and 
claims against it must be made in compliance with the MTCA. 
Under the LGTCA, the local government serves as an insurer 
that is required to defend and indemnify its employees for torts 
they commit within the scope of their employment, even though 
the local government, itself, cannot be held liable. 219 Sovereign 
immunity then protects the governmental body from liability, 
while the LGTCA protects the empl06'ees of local governments 
from paying most adverse judgments. 22 The LGTCA requires the 
local government to defend employees and requires the local 
governments to pay all judgments and settlements, unless the 
employee acted with malice or gross negligence. 221 The LGTCA 
does not waive the governmental immunity of the local 
government; 222 thus, the LGTCA does not create liability on the 
part of the local government, but does create financial 
responsibili% for the government for the non-malicious acts of its 
employees.2 3 
Accordingly, a plaintiff must sue an employee and not the 
governmental entity, but after prevailing in suit, the plaintiff must 
execute any judgment obtained against the local government. 224 A 
suit that names only the governmental entity is defective and 
subject to a motion to dismiss; one may not sue the local 
217. Rucker v. Harford County, 316 Md. 275,297,558 A.2d 399, 409-10 (1989); MD. 
CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 12-101(a)(6) (2004) (defining "a sheriff or deputy 
sheriff of a county or Baltimore City" as "State personnel"). However, under 
MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 9-108 (2006), a county or Baltimore City 
"may obtain insurance to provide the coverage and defense necessary under the 
Maryland Tort Claims Act" for "any sheriff or deputy sheriff' engaged in "law 
enforcement" or "detention center" functions. Accordingly, in counties in which 
such insurance has been obtained by the county, often the County Attorney 
defends the sheriff or deputy sheriff, rather than the Attorney General, who would 
typically defend state personnel. Additionally, if a judgment is entered, the 
county may pay the judgment from its own insurance coverage rather than from 
the State's Insurance Trust Fund. MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 9-105 
(2006). 
218. Clark v. O'Malley, 169 Md. App. 408,436,901 A.2d 279, 295 (2006). 
219. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-302 (2002). 
220. Note that the LGTCA only protects the employee from judgments and not from 
liability. See id. 
221. [d. 
222. Williams v. Prince George's County, 157 F. Supp. 2d 596, 603 (D. Md. 2001); 
Dawson v. Prince George's County, 896 F. Supp. 537, 539 (D. Md. 1995); 
Williams v. Prince George's County, 112 Md. App. 526, 552-53, 685 A.2d 884, 
897 -98 (1996). 
223. Dawson, 896 F. Supp. at 539; Khawaja v. City of Rockville. 89 Md. App. 314, 
325-26,598 A.2d 489, 494 (1991). 
224. Martino v. Bell, 40 F. Supp. 2d 719, 722 (D. Md. 1999); Ennis v. Crenca, 322 
Md. 285, 291-92,587 A.2d 485, 488-89 (1991). 
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government directly.225 Additionally, although the suit is brought 
against the employee, one may not execute a judgment against the 
employee absent proof of actual malice. 226 Concomitantly, the 
local government is obligated to defend its employee if he or she 
acted within the scope of employment and must indemnify the 
employee if a judgment is returned against him or her.227 
The LGTCA permits the government employer, in defending 
the employee, to raise any defenses or immunities held by the 
employee, "even where those defenses or immunities could not 
have been vicariously asserted by the employer to bar respondeat 
superior liability at common law.,,228 Accordingly, even though 
the local government, as employer, is not liable in tort actions for 
the tortious conduct of its employees under the doctrine of 
respondeat superior,229 it may assert the individual's potential 
defenses on the employee's behalf. 
The procedural provisions of the LGTCA apply to "all torts 
without distinction, including intentional and constitutional 
torts,,,230 and any judgment arising from such claims must be paid 
by the municipality, not the individual defendants. 231 
1. Governmental Functions vs. Proprietary Functions 
The sovereign immunity of the State extends to its agencies 
"but not to its creatures, such as municipal corporations, except 
when [they are] exercising some governmental function of the state 
itself.,,232 Until the early "twentieth century local governments 
generally had no immunity under Maryland common law in either 
tort or contract actions.,,233 But the Court of Appeals extended the 
State's sovereign immunity to municipalities when their employees 
perform "a purely governmental function,,234 and thus are acting as 
an extension of the State itself. In this context, the immunity is 
more properly identified as "governmental" rather than 
225. Martino, 40 F. Supp. 2d at 723; Williams v. Montgomery County, 123 Md. App. 
119,129,716 A.2d 1100, 1105 (1998), ajJ'd sub nom., Williams v. Maynard, 359 
Md. 379, 754 A.2d 379 (2000). 
226. Williams, 123 Md. App. at 126, 716 A.2d at 1103. 
227. Id. at 126, 716 A.2d at 1103. 
228. Pavelka v. Carter, 996 F.2d 645,649 (4th Cir. 1993). 
229. Martino, 40 F. Supp. 2d at 721; Austin v. Mayor of Baltimore, 286 Md. 51, 53, 
405 A.2d 255, 256 (1979). 
230. Thomas v. City of Annapolis, 113 Md. App. 440, 457, 688 A.2d 448, 456 (1997). 
231. Ashton v. Brown, 339 Md. 70,123-24,660 A.2d 447,473-74 (1995). 
232. Mayor of Baltimore v. State ex rei. Blueford, 173 Md. 267, 271,195 A. 571, 574 
(1937). 
233. Hous. Auth. of Baltimore v. Bennet, 359 Md. 356, 358, 754 A.2d 367, 368 
(2000). 
234. Town of Brunswick v. Hyatt, 91 Md. App. 555,559,605 A.2d 620, 622 (1992). 
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"sovereign,,,235 and the immunity "is limited to tortious conduct 
that occurs in the exercise of a 'governmental' rather than 
'proprietary' function.,,236 The immunity afforded to local 
governments is considered to be "much narrower than the 
immunity of the State.,,237 
Local governments, then, have common law immunity only for 
acts that are governmental, not for acts that are proprietary or 
private, and "they do not have immunity from liability for State 
constitutional tortS.,,238 Thus the law related to the immunity of 
local governments depends on this distinction, one that "is 
sometimes illusory in practice. ,,239 In 1937, the Court of Appeals 
offered a test to assist parties in determining whether a function 
was governmental or proprietary,240 which it later simplified to be: 
"[W]hether the act performed is for the common good of all or for 
the special benefit or profit of the corporate entity.,,241 
For historical reasons that are not well documented or 
articulated, in Maryland a municipality has a "private proprietary 
obligation,,242 and "may be responsible for protecting individuals 
who are physically within the bounds of a public way from hazards 
caused by the governmental entity which may come from outside 
the boundaries of the public way . . . and should have been 
foreseen and prevented by the governmental agency.,,243 
Therefore, "a municipality is not immune from a negligence action 
arising out of its maintenance of its public streets and 
235. Heffner v. Montgomery County, 76 Md. App. 328, 333 n.4, 545 A.2d 67,67 n.4 
(1988) ("Traditionally, sovereign immunity was the term used to describe that 
immunity enjoyed by the State while govemmental immunity was the term used 
to refer to the immunity enjoyed by a county or municipality."); see also Austin 
v. Mayor of Baltimore, 286 Md. 51, 53,405 A.2d 255, 256 (1979). 
236. Austin, 286 Md. at 53, 405 A.2d at 256. 
237. Bd. of Educ. v. Mayor of Riverdale, 320 Md. 384, 390, 578 A.2d 207, 210 
(1990). 
238. Baltimore Police Dep't v. Cherkes, 140 Md. App. 282, 314, 780 A.2d 410, 429 
(2001) (citing DiPino v. Davis, 354 Md. 18,51-52,729 A.2d 354, 372 (1999». 
239. E. Eyring & Sons Co. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 253 Md. 380, 382, 252 A.2d 824, 
825 (1969). 
240. In Mayor of Baltimore v. State ex rei. Blueford, 173 Md. 267,195 A. 571 (1937), 
the Court of Appeals held: 
Where the act in question is sanctioned by legislative authority, is 
solely for the public benefit, with no profit or emolument inuring to 
the municipality, and tends to benefit the public health and promote 
the welfare of the whole public, and has in it no element of private 
interest, it is governmental in nature. 
173 Md. at 276, 195 A. at 576. 
241. Tadjer v. Montgomery County, 300 Md. 539, 547, 479 A.2d 1321, 1326 (1984). 
242. Higgins v. City of Rockville, 86 Md. App. 670, 679, 587 A.2d 1168, 1172 
(1991). 
243. Mayor of Baltimore v. Whalen, 395 Md. 154, 167,909 A.2d 683, 691 (2006). 
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highways,,,244 even though the building and maintenance of public 
streets and sidewalks is primarily for the public benefit and 
promotes public safety and welfare. Although there is little 
evidence that any municipality incurs a profit or compensation for 
road building, government'!-l immunity is not available to local 
governments for this function. 245 . 
But most other local government activities are considered to be 
governmental. For example, the operation and maintenance of a 
public park is unquestionably a Rovernmental function,246 as well 
as the operation of a day camp,24 a town pool,248 a police force,249 
a courthouse,250 and a transportation service. 25 I 
This rather antiquarian notion of the governmental-proprietary 
distinction has been criticized as being illogical and cumbersome. 
In 1979 Judge Eldridge, of the Court of Appeals of Maryland, 
noted "the unsoundness of the governmental-Psroprietary 
distinction,,,252 a sentiment echoed by Judge Cole. 53 Judge 
Eldridge made the point again in 1984, stating: 
[T]hat the governmental-proprietary distinction is 
an irrational basis for determining whether local 
governments may be held liable in tort. The 
governmental-proprietary distinction, which has 
never been expressly sanctioned by the Maryland 
Legislature, was adopted by the Court relatively 
recently in history and with little reasoning. The 
distinction has proven to be unsound, and it should 
be abandoned. 254 
His view is that the concept suffers from the fact that the Court has 
not been able to arrive at a satisfactory definition for the 
244. Higgins, 86 Md. App. at 678, 587 A.2d at 1172 (emphasis added). A 
municipality's proprietary duty "to keep streets ... safe ... for ... travel" 
extends "to the land immediately contiguous to these public ways." Mayor of 
Baltimore v. Eagers, 167 Md. 128, 136, 173 A. 56, 60 (1934). 
245. Irvine v. Montgomery County, 239 Md. 113,118,210 A.2d 359, 362 (1965). 
246. Whalen, 395 Md. 154,909 A.2d 683. 
247. Austin v. Mayor of Baltimore, 286 Md. 51, 64-66,405 A.2d 255,262-63 (1979). 
248. Town of Brunswick v. Hyatt, 91 Md. App. 555, 564-65, 605 A.2d 620, 624-25 
(1992). 
249. Williams v. Prince George's County, 112 Md. App. 526,549-50, 685 A.2d 884, 
896 (1996). 
250. Harford County v. Love, 173 Md. 429, 433, 196 A. 122, 124 (1938). 
251. Pavelka v. Carter, 996 F.2d 645, 648 (4th Cir. 1993). But see Anne Arundel 
County v. McCormick, 323 Md. 688, 696, 594 A.2d 1138, 1142 (1991) (holding 
that the decision to purchase self-insurance for workers' compensation liability is 
a proprietary function). 
252. Austin, 286 Md. at 72, 405 A.2d at 266 (Eldridge, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
253. ld. at 83 (Cole, J., dissenting). 
254. Tadjer v. Montgomery County, 300 Md. 539, 555, 479 A.2d 1321, 1329 (1984) 
(Eldridge, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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distinction, and consequently, as a test for liability, it IS 
"unsatisfactory and illogical.,,255 
It appears that this "illogical exception to th[ e] rule [of 
governmental immunity] is too well settled ... , to be now 
questioned or discussed;,,2s6 it "seems destined to remain with us 
for the foreseeable future.,,257 
2. Limitation on Recovery 
Recovery under the LGTCA is limited to $200,000 per 
individual claim and $500,000 per total claims arising from a 
single incident, regardless of the number of claimants. 258 As with 
the MTCA, there is no Maryland appellate case that has addressed 
this issue in a death case under the LGTCA, but the principles 
discussed in Part II(B)(l) would similarly apply to LGTCA claims. 
Interpretation of these statutory limitations is analogous to the 
insurance limitations in the private sector. The limitation terms of 
both the MTCA and the LGTCA represent a per person policy 
limit, and because, in any given death case, only one person, the 
decedent, suffers bodily injury, his beneficiaries are entitled to 
make only one claim. Consequential damages are computed as 
part of the single bodily injury claim of which they are a 
consequence, and do not represent a separate claim.259 
The LGTCA states "the liability of a local government may not 
exceed $200,000 per an individual claim. ,,260 This language 
contemplates an individual bodily injury. Indeed, this limitation is 
usually reflected in a county's insurance policy because that is the 
full extent of a county's potential exposure by operation of law. 
3. Notice Requirements 
Section 5-304 of the LGTCA requires that a claimant gIve 
notice of a claim within 180 days of injury. 261 The statute 
designates which individual in various counties is the proper 
255. Austin, 286 Md. at 72, 405 A.2d at 266 (Eldridge, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). Judge Wilner has been the most recent Court of Appeals 
judge to question the doctrine's utility. See Mayor of Baltimore v. Whalen, 395 
Md. 154, 171-72, 909 A.2d 683, 693-94 (2006) (Wilner, J., concurring). 
256. Mayor of Baltimore v. State ex rei. Blueford, 173 Md. 267, 273,195 A. 571, 574 
(1937) (quoting Lave v. Minn. State Agric. Soc'y, 64 N.W. 382, 383 (1895)). 
257. Higgins v. City of Rockville, 86 Md. App. 670, 680, 587 A.2d 1168, 1173 
(1991). 
258. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-303(a)(I) (2002). 
259. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Scherr, 101 Md. App. 690, 697, 647 A.2d 1297, 
1300 (1994). 
260. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-303(a)(\) (2002) (emphasis added). 
261. [d. § 5-304(a). 
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recipient of the claim. 262 However, a claimant may be entitled to 
file suit without giving the proper notice because the statute 
includes a Waiver of Notice provision. 263 Under this provision, a 
defendant must show that it was prejudiced by the lack of notice, 
providing the plaintiff shows good cause why the notice was not 
filed. 264 . ' . 
4. Local Government Insurance 
The Local Government Insurance Trust (LGIT) is a non-profit 
insurance group that pools insurance premiums for many Ma7sland 
local governments, including counties and local entities. 2 5 It 
provides coverage for general liability, employee liability, 
automobile liability, and property.266 Some local governments are 
self-insured rather than insured by LGIT. 267 
E. Transportation Article Waiver of Immunity 
Governmental entities may also be sued under section 17-1 07 (c) 
of the Transportation Article of the Maryland Annotated Code, 
which prohibits both state and local governments from asserting 
sovereign immunity "with respect to the security that state law 
requires all vehicle owners . . . including governmental ones, to 
pOSt.,,268 Section 17-107 prohibits two things: First, drivers may 
not drive cars they know are uninsured, and owners may not permit 
their uninsured vehicles to· be driven. 269 And second, no 
governmental owner of a motor vehicle "may ... raise the defense 
of sovereign or governmental immunity . . . in any judicial 
proceeding" in which it is claimed that personal injury or property 
damage was "caused by the negligent use of [a] motor vehicle 
while in government service or performing a task of benefit to the 
government. ,,270 
This provision prevents Maryland's governmental entities from 
asserting sovereign immunity and thus being excused from 
insuring their vehicles, and ensures that motorists benefit from the 
262. Id. § 5-304(b). 
263. Id. § 5-304(c). 
264. Id. 
265. Local Government Insurance Trust, http://www.lgit.org/about/overview.htm (last 
visited Dec. 30, 2006). 
266. Id. 
267. But see id., http;//www.lgit.org/about/membecdirectory.htm (last visited Dec. 
30,2006) (containing a list oflocal governments insured by LGIT). 
268. Pavelka v. Carter, 996 F.2d 645, 648 (4th Cir. 1993). The Transportation Article 
requires vehicle owners, including the government, to carry minimal insurance 
coverage. MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. §17-I03(a)(2006). 
269. MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. § l7-107(a). 
270. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-524 (2002); MD. CODE ANN., TRANsP. § 
17-107(c). 
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protections and potential recovery that Title 17 is intended to 
provide. 271 For these purposes, sub-section 17-107 (c) "puts 
governmental vehicle owners . . . in the same position as private 
,,272 
owners .... 
The Legislature intended to provide citizens minimal recovery 
for injuries resulting from the negligence of governmental 
drivers. 273 It is the owner of the motor vehicle that is forbidden 
from raising the defense of sovereign or governmental immunity, 
not the employee-driver. 274 Local government employees do not 
enjoy common law immunity for their negligent driving acts, but 
are entitled to indemnification from the local government employer 
pursuant to the LGTCA. 275 State employees who drive negligently 
may assert the immunity provided by statute, if they were acting in 
the scope of their employment and without malice or gross 
negligence. 276 
In addition, operators of emergency vehicles are immune from 
suit in their individual capacity from negligent acts or omissions 
committed while operating the emergency vehicle "in the 
performance of emergency service," but the governmental owner is 
still liable for resultant damages under the terms of § 17-103.277 
If a suit is filed involving a governmental vehicle under this 
section, the maximum recovery available is $20,000 per person, 
per motor vehicle accident ($40,000 total), and $15,000 in total 
property damage. 278 A plaintiff is not required to give any notice 
claim to the liable governmental entity before suing under this 
provision.279 
In order to take advantage of the "more expansive waiver of 
immunity" provided by the MTCA,280 an injured motorist must 
comply with the MTCA's notice provisions. Compliance with the 
notice provisions of the LGTCA, on the other hand, does not 
expand the waiver of the immunity enjoyed by a county, since the 
LGTCA does not waive immunity to begin with. 281 




275. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-302; Pavelka, 996 F.2d at 650. 
276. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-522(b). 
277. [d. § 5-639. 
278. MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. §17-103(b). 
279. See Maryland v. Harris, 327 Md. 32,41,607 A.2d 552,557 (1992). 
280. Pavelka v. Carter, 996 F.2d 645, 649 (4th Cir. 1993); see also Maryland v. Harris, 
327 Md. 32, 38,607 A.2d 552,555 (1992). 
281. Pavelka, 996 F.2d at 649. 
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F. State Law Provides Other Immunity for Government 
Employees 
(Vol. 36 
Similar to the· United States Code, the Annotated Code of 
Maryland contains various other immunities for government 
employees and officials. . For example, the Courts & Judicial 
Proceedings Article, Title 5, Subtitle 5, entitled "Immunities and 
Prohibited Actions-Governmental" provides numerous other 
specific forms of immunity.282 Here we find such items as 
immunity for the Department of Liquor Control for Montgomery 
County,283 for members of military courts,284 and for county 
boards of education. 285 And other code sections may overlap. For 
instance, the Education Article provides sovereign immunity for "a 
county board of education" 286 and for county board employees. 287 
Accordingly, practitioners must search the code when bringing or 
defending tort suits to ensure that he or she considers the impact of 
every applicable section on the litigation. 
Additionally, government employees in Maryland may 
frequently be entitled to assert common law "public official" 
immunity from negligence torts extending beyond the 
governmental entity itself when they exercise discretionary 
functions. 288 The functions of most high ranking government 
officials and all police officers are discretionary.289 But employees 
who perform "ministerial" functions, and who are not considered 
"public officials" are not entitled to this immunity.290 Thus, for a 
defendant to establish that he is entitled to the defense of public 
official immunity, he must show that: (1) He is a public official, 
(2) the conduct complained of was discretionary in nature, and (3) 
the act(s) he performed were within the scope of his official 
282. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. §§ 5-501 to 5-527 (2002). 
283. Id. § 5-504. 
284. Id. § 5-513. 
285. Id. § 5-518(b). 
286. MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 4-105(d)(2004). 
287. Id. § 4-106(a). 
288. Pavelka v. Carter, 996 F.2d 645, 649 (4th Cir. 1993); Thomas v. City of 
Annapolis, 113 Md. App. 440,452,688 A.2d 448, 454 (1997); see also Lovelace 
v. Anderson, 126 Md. App. 667,692,730 A.2d 774, 787 (1999), ajJ'd in part, 
rev'd in part and remanded by 366 Md. 690, 785 A.2d 726 (2001); Williams v. 
Mayor of Baltimore, 128 Md. App. 1, 14-19, 736 A.2d 1084, 1091-94 (1999), 
ajJ'd in part, rev'd in part, 359 Md. 101, 753 A.2d 41 (2000). 
289. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-511(b); see also Lovelace, 126 Md. App. 
at 692, 730 A.2d at 787 (holding that the immunity under § 5-511 (b) applies to 
Maryland police officers); Bradshaw v. Prince George's County, 284 Md. 294, 
302-03, 396 A.2d 255, 260-61 (1979), abrogated by Cox v. Prince George's 
County, 296 Md. 162,460 A.2d 1038 (1983). 
290. Pavelka, 996 F.2d at 649 (holding a bus driver is an employee who performs 
ministerial functions). 
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duties. 291 Officials of "governmental entities,,292 have a similar 
defense established by statute. 293 
Like state statutory immunity, public official immunity is 
qualified; that is, it only provides a shield from liability as long as 
the official acted without malice or gross negligence. 294 
G. Federal Common Law Provides Qualified Immunity for State 
Government Actors Alleged to Have Committed Violations of 
the United States Constitution 
A federal statue, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, authorizes suits against state 
and local officials and, in certain cases, local governments for 
violations of federal constitutional and statutory rights. The statute 
reads: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, 
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any 
State or Territory or the District of Columbia, 
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of 
the United States or other person within the 
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, 
privileges, or immumtIes secured by the 
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party 
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other 
proper proceeding for redress .... 295 
Section 1983 allows a person to make a claim for relief against a 
government official who, acting under color of state law, violated 
the person's federal constitutional or statutory rights. 296 To state a 
claim, the plaintiff must allege (1) a deprivation of a federal right 
and (2) that "the person who ... deprived him of that right acted 
under color of state ... law.,,297 More specifically, a plaintiff must 
plead and prove four elements: 
1. conduct by a "person;" 298 
29l. Thomas, 113 Md. App. at 452,688 A.2d at 454. 
292. See MD. CODE ANN., art. 26, § I(b) (2005) (providing the definition of 
governmental entity). 
293. ld. §§ 2-3; MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-511(b). 
294. Livesay v. Baltimore County, 384 Md. I, 12,862 A.2d 33, 39 (2004); Lovelace, 
366 Md. 690 at 714, 785 A.2d at 739. 
295. 42 U.S.c. § 1983 (2000). 
296. ld. 
297. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980). 
298. The word "person" under § 1983 does not include a state agency, or a state 
official sued in an official capacity. See Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 
U.S. 58, 61 (1989). However, municipalities and municipal officials sued in 
either an official or personal capacity are "persons" under § 1983. See Monnell 
v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978) (noting that local 
governments have historically enjoyed less immunity protection than other 
sovereigns). 
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2. who acted under "color of law;" 
3. that proximately caused; 
4. a deprivation of federally protected rights. 299 
A wide range of federal constitutional and federal statutory 
rights may be enforced through § 1983 suits,300 and § 1983 applies 
to the states by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment. Because § 
1983 itself does not create federally protected rights, a complainant 
must allege the constitutional or federal statutory basis for his or 
her claim. 301 Indeed, the Supreme Court in § 1983 cases requires 
that judicial "analysis begin[] by identifying the specific 
constitutional [or statutory] right allegedly infringed by the 
challenged [ conduct]." 302 
While § 1983 is a powerful tool for plaintiffs to use in suing 
governmental agents in Maryland, its application is tempered by 
. well-established defenses. In addition to the usual defenses 
available in tort cases, § 1983 defendants are entitled to assert the 
common law defenses of absolute or qualified immunity. 303 
"Judges, prosecutors~ witnesses and legislators" are generally 
entitled to assert absolute immunity; "executive and administrative 
officials may assert qualified immunity.,,304 
The State of Maryland cannot be sued under § 1983 because it 
is not a "person" and because it is protected by the Eleventh 
Amendment. 305 However, a municipal government may be liable 
under § 1983 if a plaintiff alleges, and can prove, that the 
unconstitutional action he complains of "resulted from a CountY 
policy, practice or custom.,,306 Such proof must ordinarily consist 
299. MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ, 21ST ANNUAL SECTION 1983 CIVIL RiGHTS LITIGATION, 
VOL. 1 at 45 (2004). 
300. MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION: CLAIMS AND DEFENSES, § 2 
(4th ed., vol. 1 2004). 
301. See, e.g., Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329,340 (1997) (must allege violation 
of a federal right, not just violation of federal law); Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 
439,464 (1991) (claim for violation of dormant Commerce Clause); Graham v. 
Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (claims for violation of Fourth 
Amendment); Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1,4,7,11-12 (1980) (wide array of 
federal statutory rights enforceable under § 1983). 
302. Graham, 490 U.S. at 394. Note also that violations of state law are not 
enforceable under § 1983. See, e.g., Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 142 
(1979). However, state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over § 1983 claims. 
Nat'l Private Truck Council v. Okla. Tax Comm'n, 515 U.S. 582, 588 (1995). 
State court defendants sued under § 1983 may remove the case to federal court. 
28 U.S.c. § 1441 (a)-(b) (2000). 
303. Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 163-64 (1992). 
304. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 299, at 67. For an interesting discussion about the 
disjointed manner in which the Supreme Court has developed § 1983 immunity 
principles, see Jack M. Beermann, A Critical Approach to Section 1983 with 
Special Attention to Sources o/Law, 42 STAN. L. REv. 51, 66-70 (1989). 
305. See supra Part II(C). 
306. Williams v. Prince George's County, 157 F. Supp. 2d 596, 601 (D. Md. 2001); 
see also Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978). 
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of evidence that a local government operates according to a policy 
statement, ordinance, or regulation that "is both fairly attributable 
to the municipality as its own and is the moving force behind the 
specific constitutional violation. ,,307 When a municipal policy is 
itself unconstitutional because it directs or authorizes employees to 
commit constitutional violations, a plaintiff is not required to also 
show that the policy caused his or her constitutional injury.308 
A judicially created creature, the qualified immunity defense 
involves the balancing of an individual's right to vindicate his or 
her federal rights with the social need to allow officials to exercise 
discretion and perform their duties without apprehension of 
liability.309 One commentator asserts that "[ q]ualified immunity 
may well be the most important issue in § 1983 litigation," and 
notes that many § 1983 cases are disposed of in favor of 
defendants based on the qualified immunity defense. 310 
Qualified immunity is not only immunity from liability, but also 
from suit itself and from "the other burdens of litigation.,,311 A 
form of common law immunity, the Supreme Court determined in 
1982 that qualified immunity should be available to § 1983 
defendants whose actions, even if unconstitutional, were 
objectively reasonable. 312 These cases often arise in the context 
of law enforcement activity. An example is one in which police 
officers shot a suspect they discovered hiding in a dark closet 
holding a long metal object. 313 The officers were entitled to 
qualified immunity from suit for shooting the suspect because their 
belief that he had a shotgun was objectively reasonable. 314 In 
reality, the suspect was holding a vacuum cleaner hose. 315 
Whether a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity is a legal 
question to be decided by the court and is often presented in a 
motion for summary judgment. In analyzing whether the defense 
is available, the court must engage in a two-step analysis. The 
court must first determine if the complaint states a violation of 
federally protected rights. 316 If there has been no violation, the 
complaint fails to state a claim and the application of the immunity 
307. Williams, 157 F. Supp. 2d at 601 (citing Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1387 
(4th Cir. 1987)). 
308. Monell, 436 U.S. at 661. 
309. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 
232,239-41 (1974). 
310. Schwartz, supra note 299, at 70. 
311. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). 
312. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 (1982). 
313. Cf Greenidge v. Ruffin, 927 F.2d 789, 790 (4th Cir. 1991) (suspect in a car). 
314. Cf id. at 791-92. 
315. Cf id. at 790 (in reality the suspect was holding a wooden night stick). 
316. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). 
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defense is essentially unnecessary. 317 The court should dismiss the 
claim on a defense motion. 318 Even if the defendant-official did 
violate the plaintiff s constitutional or statutory rights, he is still 
entitled to immunity if his actions were objectively reasonable 
under the circumstances. 319 
One indicia of objective reasonableness is whether the law that 
the official allegedly violated was "clearly established" at the time 
of the events underlying the claim. 320 This is known as the "fair 
warning" test, to ensure that the official was on notice of the state 
of the law so as to realize whether he violated the law.321 Further, 
the defendant's subjective motivation behind his actions is 
irrelevant to the defense because the immunity is evaluated on an 
objective basis, even though the court's inquiry is fact-specific. 
Because qualified immunity is immunity from suit, a § 1983 
defendant may immediately appeal a pre-trial denial of a motion 
asserting the defense. 322 
In Harlow v. Fitzgerald,323 the Supreme Court explained that it 
assumed that the 42nd Congress was aware of, and intended for, 
common law tort immunities to apply to § 1983 actions, as they are 
procedurally treated as involving claims for personal injury and are 
thus referred to as "constitutional torts." 324 The Court has 
developed a functional approach to immunity. 325 An immunity 
defense is available if the official would have been immune from 
tort liability in 1867 and if that immunity is consistent with the 
policy goals underlying § 1983. 326 
Section 1983 suits create significant social costs to the benefit 
of individuals. A large number of these suits are filed, creating a 
strain on the judicial system. 327 The cases are expensive to litigate 
and those eXEenses are often borne by the state and local 
governments. 3 8 Requiring public officials to participate in the 
litigation diverts them from their official functions and the threat of 
317. Id. at 194,201; see also Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 552 (1985). 
318. Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526. 
319. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205. 
320. !d. at 201. 
321. RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: 
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 19.29 (1983). 
322. Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 306 (1996) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 
U.S. 511, 530 (1985». 
323. 457 U.S. 800 (1982). 
324. ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 321, at § 19.28. 
325. Id. 
326. Id. 
327. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814 (1982). 
328. !d.; see also Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart Schwab, The Reality of 
Constitutional Tort Litigation, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 641, 650-51 (1987). 
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suit may intimidate them in performing those public duties. 329 
Finally, without qualified immunity, individuals would be reluctant 
to serve in public employment. 330 
Thus, when a state actor has committed a constitutional 
violation, the state actor is protected by qualified immuni~ so long 
as the state actor acted reasonably, even if mistakenly.3 1 Some 
commentators have asserted that this principle seriously limits the 
success that § 1983 plaintiffs may realize and that it may not have 
a legitimate, historical place in § 1983 litigation.332 
Relatively modern principles of tort law seem to underlie the 
Supreme Court's extensive application of the qualified immunity 
defense. 333 The line of cases that has created "a pure federal law 
of immunities,,334 has made it more difficult for civil rights 
plaintiffs to recover damages. Qualified immunity has been 
criticized, not only for "limiting official accountability for 
unconstitutional conduct,,,335 but also for limiting the remedial 
purposes of § 1983 and changing substantive constitutional law. 
CONCLUSION 
Sovereign immunity has been described as "so complex" in its 
"legal idiosyncrasies.,,336 The FTCA is referred to as "a statute of 
unique complexity,,,337 while the MTCA has its own special 
quirks. The waiver of sovereign immunity found in the MTCA is 
not found in the LGTCA. The immunity to which federal, state, 
and local employees are entitled varies not only with their 
employment status, but with their particular function, the cause of 
action alleged, and the legal standard of review used to analyze 
their conduct. 
329. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814 (quoting Gregoire v. Biddle 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 
1949)). 
330. Id. 
331. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 205-06 (200 I); Waterman v. Batton, 393 F.3d 471, 
476-77 (4th Cir. 2005). 
332. David Rudovsky, The Qualified Immunity Doctrine in the Supreme Court: 
Judicial Activism and the Restriction a/Constitutional Rights, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 
23, 27 (1989) (qualified immunity "directly limits individual liability for 
constitutional violations by denying a damage remedy for conduct that violates 
the Constitution"). 
333. Beermann, supra note 304, at 67. 
334. Id. Beermann criticizes the Court for making policy with development and 
application of qualified immunity. Id. 
335. Rudovsky, supra note 332, at 27 ("Qualified immunity has emerged as one of the 
most significant and problematic defenses to claims of civil rights violations."); 
Beermann, supra note 304. 
336. Boger et ai, supra note 11, at 507. 
337. !d. at 533; see also Santoro, supra note 64, at 224 ("[T]here are certain 
peculiarities of the Act which can make litigating a tort case against the 
government a set of traps for the unwary."). 
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A recent simple automobile tort case illustrates these 
complications. Plaintiff was involved in a minor motor vehicle 
accident with a County Deputy Sheriff in a county in which the 
Sheriff is the chief law enforcement officer. There is no county 
police department. Prior to filing suit, plaintiff makes a claim 
pursuant to the LGTCA, addressed to the County Attorney. The 
County Attorney infonns her that Deputy Sheriffs are state 
constitutional officers and thus state employees, and that she must 
satisfy the prerequisites of the MTCA before filing suit. 
Plaintiff makes a claim to the State Treasurer, pursuant to the 
MTCA. The Insurance Division of the State Treasurer's Office 
denies the claim, noting that when perfonning law enforcement 
functions, as opposed to "traditional" Sheriffs Office duties, 
Deputy Sheriffs are insured by the county in which they work, 
although Sheriffs are state employees for purposes of MTCA 
statutory immunity. The Treasurer refers plaintiff back to the 
county, and plaintiff makes another LGTCA claim to the county. 
The county denies the claim, and plaintiff files a negligence suit 
in the District Court of Maryland, naming the county as defendant. 
The county moves to dismiss, arguing that the county is immune 
from suit for the governmental function of law enforcement, and 
that only an employee can be sued. Plaintiff re-files the suit, 
naming the individual Deputy Sheriff as defendant. 
The Deputy Sheriff moves to dismiss based on public official 
and MTCA immunity for state personnel, and prevails. If the 
statue of limitations has not run out, the plaintiff re-files her suit 
against the State of Maryland, the employer of state personnel. If 
the plaintiff gets a judgment in her favor, the plaintiff will have to 
detennine whether to execute that judgment against the SITF or the 
county, which must indemnify its employees. 
"Immunity ... plays a vital role in our system; it is not so much 
a barrier to individual rights as it is a structural protection for 
democratic rule.,,338 But if attorneys do not understand the 
intricacies of this area of the law, and do not understand how to use 
the principles to prosecute or defend civil litigation against the 
government, individual rights may be compromised, as well as the 
effective functioning of the government itself. Statutory and 
common laws have, for the most part, struck an appropriate 
balance between the two-a balance that is fascinating in its 
delicacy. 
338. Krent, supra note 1, at 1530. 
